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OUT FROM THE SHADOWS: TITLE IX, UNIVERSITY




Confidentiality is a challenge and an opportunity for university ad-
ministrators in charge of resolving campus sexual misconduct. As an
opportunity, confidentiality can be used to build trust, provide self-
determination, and ensure privacy for survivors and alleged perpetrators.
Confidentiality also presents significant challenges because it may pre-
vent people from the reporting of all known instances of sexual miscon-
duct. Without knowing about an instance of sexual misconduct, universi-
ty officials are unable to investigate and remedy problems, potentially
exposing the institution to liability. Title IX Coordinators oversee a com-
pliance regime that mandates reporting but in practice results in wide-
spread underreporting of campus sexual misconduct. Both formal and
informal reporting mechanisms are necessary to manage sexual miscon-
duct disputes, but currently neither Ombuds nor Title IX Coordinators
adhere to their respective archetypes. The result is increased liability risk
to the institution, fewer procedural choices for survivors and alleged per-
petrators, and processes that lack legitimacy. In order to fulfill the man-
dates of Title IX, universities must implement and utilize organizational
Ombuds offices that adhere to the International Ombudsman Associa-
tion's (IOA) standards of practice. Non-conforming Ombuds must be
mandatory reporters, as only a true alternative reporting mechanism can
overcome the current ineffectiveness of the formal complaint system.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a University Title IX Coordinator who uses formal-
ized processes modeled in some ways on procedures used by prosecutors
and courts in order to ensure a hostility-free educational environment. A
female undergraduate student is in your office telling you she was a vic-
tim of a sexual assault. You believe her, but you believe it is a coin toss
as to whether the evidence will be enough to prove the assault occurred.
She never wants to see the perpetrator again, she does not want her par-
ents to find out, and she is wary of going through a public hearing. She is
very emotional and simply wants someone to know what happened. She
tells you, "I knew it was a mistake coming here!" According to the 2011
Dear Colleague letter' and your university's official policies, you have an
obligation to investigate every instance of sexual misconduct. Yet you
Editors' Note: Portions of this Article reference, quote, and discuss confidential inter-
views as part of the Author's qualitative dissertation research. The Editors of the Denver Law Re-
view did not verify this content due to the Author's Confidential Disclosure Agreements with
the Interviewees. Conducted using widely accepted research methods, the Author's research was
supervised by the School of Public Affairs and Administration and approved by the University of
Kansas Institutional Review Board.
I. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Apr. 4,
2011) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER],
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. The Department of Educa-
tion determined that this letter was a "significant guidance document" under the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget's Final Bulletin for Agency Good Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007).
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also know that the hearing process in this case would be arduous and
could generate considerable publicity. Further, if you begin even the first
step of the formal process of investigation and hearings as required by
the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter2 and university policy,3 you will be una-
ble to guarantee confidentiality to this distraught student. What do you
do?
Consider another scenario. Imagine you are a University Ombuds
tasked with providing an informal means for hearing complaints. The
same student is in your office telling you she was a victim of a sexual
assault. Your institution is under investigation for the mishandling of
prior sexual assault complaints.4 Because of this investigation and the
heightened attention to adhering strictly to the guidelines in the U.S. De-
partment of Education, Office for Civil Rights 2011 Dear Colleague Let-
ter,5 you face considerable pressure to report any instances of sexual
misconduct. To do otherwise would seem to the investigators, and your
university superiors, as an instance of sweeping abuses under the rug.6
But, as an Ombuds, you are bound by a commitment requiring you to
maintain the confidentiality of every person who makes a complaint to
you.7 The student before you asks you about the investigation and hear-
ing process, which you know to be difficult for victims and often does
not result in a finding of misconduct. Hearing your description of the
process, she says that she does not want to be dragged through such an
ordeal. This is the second person over the past year to come into your
office and make an allegation against this particular perpetrator. The two
complaints are quite similar. They seem to you to be quite credible and
compelling evidence that the university has a sexual predator on campus.
What do you do?
As illustrated by the above scenarios, sexual misconduct is an ongo-
ing problem on university campuses,8 and universities are scrambling to
2. Id. at 4.
3. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MICH. STATE UNIV., UNIVERSITY POLICY ON
RELATIONSHIP VIOLENCE & SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 24-25 (rev. ed. Aug. 31, 2016),
https://www.hr.msu.edu/documents/uwidepolproc/RVSMPolicy.pdf.
4. Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/ (last updated Sept. 9, 2016) (listing 282 open federal investiga-
tions).
5. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 1, at 2.
6. Kirsten Gillibrand, We Will Not Allow These Crimes to Be Swept Under the Rug Any
Longer, TIME (May 15, 2014), http://time.com/100144/kirsten-gillibrand-campus-sexual-assault/.
7. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE §§ 3.1-3.8 (INT'L OMBUDSMAN ASS'N 2009),
http://www.ombudsassociation.org/IOAMain/media/SiteFiles/IOAStandardsofPracticeOctO9.p
df.
8. See DAVID CANTOR ET AL., WESTAT, REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY
ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 57 tbl.3-2 (2015),
https://www.aau.edu/uploadedFiles/AAUPublications/AAU-Reports/SexualAssaultCampusSur
vey/Report%20on%20the%20AAU%20Campus%20Climate%20Survey%2Oon%2OSexual%2OAssa
ult%20and%2OSexual%20Misconduct.pdf (stating that since entering college, 23.1% of female
undergraduates surveyed reported experiencing nonconsensual penetration or sexual touching in-
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address it. 9 This Article focuses on two alternative structures for address-
ing university sexual misconduct. The first of these university structures
is the Title IX Coordinator, an official charged with enforcing the law
through law-informed procedures.o The second is the Ombuds, an offi-
cial who, although given no formally defined responsibility, is available
to hear all manner of complaints and usually performs this role through
no law-like procedures." Each of these structures hears and responds to
complaints in an increasingly legalized environment plagued by an epi-
demic of peer sexual violence.
A. The Problem of Campus Sexual Misconduct
The difficulty facing universities in the area of sexual misconduct,
and the high stakes accompanying the tension between these two alterna-
tive procedures, is compounded by sharp crosscutting pressures. There is
an epidemic of peer sexual violence occurring on campuses across the
nation.12 A recent study found one-third of undergraduate female seniors
report being a victim of nonconsensual sexual contact at least once dur-
ing college.13 Drugs and alcohol surely contribute to many of these as-
saults, accentuating the problem as so many college students drink to
excess.14 Evidence indicates sexual misconduct is widely underreport-
ed.15 Non-reporting occurs due to a fear of reprisal and a belief the pro-
cess will not work or not be fair.16 The problem especially occurs within
relationships (romantic as well as hierarchical), making it more difficult
for survivors to come forward.17 In part, the problem is a product of the
university context itself, requiring that institutions take action to remedi-
ate the effects of sexual misconduct.18 Perceptions of organizational tol-
erance to sexual harassment are significantly related to the frequency of
sexual harassment incidents and the effectiveness in combating the prob-
lem.19 Organizationally, studies reveal that where a choice of sanctions
volving physical force or incapacitation); Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, upra
note 4.
9. About ATIXA and Title IX, ATIXA, https://atixa.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2016)
("Now, schools are scrambling to update policies, implement raining, and understand the Office for
Civil Rights' (OCR) expectations for prevention.").
10. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 1, at 7.
11. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, §§ 4.1-4.5.
12. See generally CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE CAMPUS
SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/221153.pdf;
David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists, 17
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73, 73 (2002).
13. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 8, at xiv.
14. William DeJong, The Impact of Alcohol on Campus Life, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON
THE COLLEGE CAMPUS: PROMOTING STUDENT GROWTH AND RESPONSIBILITY, AND REAWAKENING
THE SPIRIT OF CAMPUS COMMUNITY 101, 104 (David R. Karp & Thom Alena eds., 2004).
15. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
19. Camille Gallivan Nelson, Jane A. Halpert & Douglas F. Cellar, Organizational Responses
for Preventing and Stopping Sexual Harassment: Effective Deterrents or Continued Endurance?, 56
74 [Vol. 94:1
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for harassment is available, it is common for the least stringent to be se-
lected, such as a formal or informal warning without further action.20
Such responses indicate a deflection of organizational responsibility and
may indicate a "climate of tolerance."2 1
In sum, Title IX Coordinators face a context in which there is a lot
of sexual misconduct, misconduct especially occurs within romantic and
other relationships involving power dynamics, and survivors are very
hesitant to come forward. Universities must implement processes that
facilitate rather than discourage individuals to make complaints. Fur-
thermore, these processes must fairly adjudicate responsibility for mis-
conduct. Finally, universities need mechanisms for ensuring that univer-
sity leaders know about significant problems and must develop ways to
address these problems.
B. The Legal Context of Campus Sexual Misconduct
The legal environment puts pressure on universities to address the
problem of sexual misconduct through the lens of individual com-
plaints.22 The Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR)
is tasked with enforcing Title IX of the Educational Amendments of
1972.23 Title IX promotes equity in academic and athletics programs,
prohibits hostile environments on the basis of sex, prohibits sexual har-
assment and sexual violence, and directs universities to protect com-
plainants against retaliation and to remedy the effects of other gender-
based forms of discrimination.2 4 Originally codified in the Title IX im-
plementing regulations, federal funding recipients are required to "desig-
nate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and
carry out its responsibilities under [Title IX], including any investigation
of any complaint communicated to such recipient alleging its noncompli-
ance with [Title IX] or alleging any actions which would be prohibited
by [Title IX]." 25 In response to Title IX, universities created Title IX
compliance officers and organizational mechanisms for addressing indi-
SEX ROLES 811, 811 (2007); see also Kathi Miner-Rubino & Lilia M. Cortina, Working in a Context
of Hostility Toward Women: Implications for Employees' Well-Being, 9 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 107, 107 (2004).
20. Denise Salin, Organisational Responses to Workplace Harassment: An Exploratory
Study, 38 PERSONNEL REV. 26, 39-40 (2008).
21. Paula McDonald, Workplace Sexual Harassment 30 Years on: A Review of the Literature,
14 INT'L J. MOMT. REVIEWS 1, 21 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Julie Novkov, Equality, Process, and Campus Sexual Assault, 75 MD. L. REV. 590, 614
(2016) ("1 observe here that, thus far, we have been thinking of campus sexual assault as a private
and individualized criminal or quasi-criminal wrong in which campus authorities become involved
because of the need to resolve disputes between and among students.").
23. Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP'T EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/print/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html ( ast modified Apr. 29, 2015).
24. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE 3, 11, 15-16,24 (2015) (hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX
RESOURCE GUIDE], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-title-ix-coordinators-guide-
201504.pdf.
25. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a) (2016).
2016] 75
DENVER LAW RE VIEW
vidual complaints of sexual harassment and gender inequities.26 Over
thirty years after Title IX's implementation, compliance officers are now
known as Title IX Coordinators.27
According to the Association for Title IX Administrators (ATIXA),
there are 25,000 individuals who assure Title IX compliance in schools,
colleges, and universities across the country.28 This means coordinating
investigations and providing information and consultation to potential
complainants, and receiving formal notice of complaints.2 9 Title IX Co-
ordinators or their staff schedule, coordinate or oversee grievance hear-
ings, conduct investigations, make findings of violations of Title IX,
notify parties of decisions, and provide information of the right and pro-
cedures of appeal.30 They also train staff, maintain records, ensure that
timelines and procedures are followed, and provide ongoing training,
consultation, and technical assistance.31 The authority of a Title IX coor-
dinator is to conduct a formal and defined process to determine whether
32there has been a violation of the law. All educational institutions are
bound by their own policies and procedures, constitutional due process
mandates, state contract and civil rights law, federal education laws, and
the oversight of the Department of Education Office for Civil Rights.33
Dear Colleague Letters, issued through OCR, specify and clarify the re-
quirements of Title IX. 34 While these Dear Colleague Letters lack the
force of law, courts pay them great attention.3 5 The legal standards for
compliance by universities remained unclear until OCR issued a Dear
Colleague Letter on April 4, 2011.36
The Dear Colleague Letter issued on April 4, 2011 dramatically
shifted the interpretation of Title IX enforcement by prescribing the
knowledge37 and evidentiary standards38 for handling sexual misconduct
26. RISA L. LIEBERWITZ ET AL., AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, THE HISTORY, USES, AND
ABUSES OF TITLE IX 102 (2016), https://www.aaup.org/file/TitlelXreport.pdf.
27. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 24, at 1.
28. About ATIXA and Title IX, supra note 9.
29. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 24, at 2, 4, 16.
30. About ATIXA and Title IX, supra note 9, at 2, 5.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2.
33. See generally Mathew R. Triplett, Note, Sexual Assault on College Campuses: Seeking
the Appropriate Balance Between Due Process and Victim Protection, 62 DUKE L.J. 487, 492
(2012).
34. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 1, at 2.
35. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(directing courts to defer to administrative interpretations of their authorizing legislation except
when those interpretations contravene the law).
36. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 1, at 2-3.
37. Id. at 4 (providing that a university must take action "[i]f a school knows or reasonably
should know about student-on-student harassment hat creates a hostile environment"). This interpre-
tation represented a sharp departure from the "actual knowledge and deliberate indifference" stand-
ard for private lawsuits for monetary damages. See id. at 4 n.12. Schools can no longer avoid
knowledge of sexual harassment, and it is much easier to show that responsible university employees
knew or should have known of the misconduct.
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disputes and by requiring universities to address student-to-student sexu-
al misconduct on or off campus.39 The letter also provides guidance on
what constitutes fair procedures, including discouraging schools from
allowing the parties to question or cross-examine one another, giving
institutions discretion to determine whether to permit parties to have
counsel (provided both sides are treated equally), and mandating that
40both parties have the right to invoke an appeal process.
The Letter also requires educational training for employees,4i im-
plementation of preventative education programs, and provision of com-
prehensive survivor resources.42 Finally, the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter
affirms the requirement that universities are required to employ a Ti-
tle IX Coordinator and clarifies Title IX Coordinators should not have
other job responsibilities that may create a conflict of interest.43
OCR released a Question and Answers document in 2014 and a Re-
source Guide in 2015 to provide further clarification on what constitutes
compliance with Title IX." Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,45
the "Campus SaVE Act" within the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence
Against Women Act," the Clery Act,47 FERPA,4 8 due process rights,49
38. Id. at 11 (requiring the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard and noting that
"[t]he 'clear and convincing' standard . .. currently used by some schools, is a higher [and improper]
standard of proof').
39. Id. at 4 (dramatically increasing the scope of cases for which Title IX Coordinators are
responsible by providing that "[s]chools may have an obligation to respond to student-on-student
sexual harassment that initially occurred off school grounds, outside a school's education program or
activity" and that "[i]f a student files a complaint with the school, regardless of where the conduct
occurred, the school must process the complaint in accordance with its established procedures").
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id. at 4, 12 (requiring training for employees likely to witness or receive reports of sexual
misconduct and declaring that in sexual violence cases the fact-finder and the decision-maker should
have adequate training or knowledge regarding sexual violence).
42. Id. at 14.
43. Id. at 7 ("[S]erving as the Title IX coordinator and a disciplinary hearing board member or
general counsel may create a conflict of interest.").
44. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 24; OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
(2014) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS],
http://www2.ed.gov/aboutloffices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf. The Department of Education
determined that he questions and answers document was a "significant guidance document" under
the Office of Management and Budget's Final Bulletin for Agency Good Practices, 72 Fed. Reg.
3432 (Jan. 25, 2007).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (prohibiting employers from discriminating in the terms
and conditions of employment based upon "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"), limited on
constitutional grounds by Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008).
46. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 304, 127
Stat. 54, 89-92 (2013) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2012)). The Campus Sexual
Violence Elimination Act of 2013, or "Campus SaVE Act," is embedded within the 2013 reauthori-
zation of 1994's Violence Against Women Act. Id.
47. Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crimes Statistics (Clery)
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2012). The Clery Act was originally called the Crime Awareness and
Campus Security Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 105-542, 104 Stat. 2381, 2384-87, and was amended by
the Campus SaVE Act, Pub. L. No 113-4, § 304, 127 Stat. 54, 89-92.
48. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513,
88 Stat. 484, 571-74 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012)).
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and administrative law all add additional legal requirements. Further,
survivors may enforce their rights via private action initiated against her
school.o
In concert with the new law, federal administrators are making it
clear that preventing and handling campus sexual assaults must be a uni-
versity priority. In January 2014, President Obama pledged to develop a
coordinated federal response to combat campus sexual assault.51 Presi-
dent Obama created a White House Task Force on Protecting Students
From Sexual Assault, designed to provide colleges with information on
best practices, to ensure compliance with legal obligations, to increase
the transparency of federal enforcement, to increase the public's aware-
ness of individual college's compliance with the law, and to facilitate
coordination among federal agencies.52 The White House Task Force
(WHTF) issued its first report, "Not Alone," in April 2014, and created a
website, NotAlone.gov, to provide resources for schools and students.53
The task force report recommends campus climate surveys,54 actively
engaging with men, and actively creating campus bystander programs to
change campus cultures.55 The report also recommends giving survivors
more control over the process by ensuring a place to go for confidential
advice and support.56 It recommends training officials in how to address
the trauma that attends sexual assault.
Since OCR began tracking sexual misconduct Title IX complaints
in 2009, the number of complaints filed against colleges has tripled from
eleven in 2009 to thirty-three through April of 2014.8 As of November
29, 2016, there were 287 open federal Title IX investigations under-
way.5 9 Despite this trend, an analysis of Title IX complaints filed with
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held ... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (binding the states to the
same language).
50. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (holding a private damages
action for sexual harassment may proceed on Title IX grounds only where the funding recipient acts
with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment and the harassment is "so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or
benefit").
51. Libby Sander, Obama Promises Governmentwide Scrutiny of Campus Rape, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Obama-Promises-
Govemmentwide/144147/.
52. Id.
53. See THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT,
NOT ALONE: THE FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM
SEXUAL ASSAULT (2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/report 0.pdf
54. Id. at 8.
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id at 11.
57. Id at 3.
58. Jonah Newman & Libby Sander, A Promise Unfulfilled, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 9,
2014, at A20, A24.
59. Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, supra note 4.
78 [Vol. 94:1
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the Department of Education from 2003 to 2013 found that fewer than
one in ten led to a formal agreement o change campus policies.60
Increased attention to sexual misconduct has also led to a prolifera-
tion of complaints and lawsuits. In January of 2013, student Andrea Pino
and four other complainants made a federal complaint against the Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill accusing the university of negli-
gently handling its responses to rape. Students elsewhere filed similar
complaints against Amherst, Berkeley, Dartmouth, Occidental, Swarth-
more, and Vanderbilt and other universities.62 Students accused of sexual
misconduct are also finding success after filing complaints. In 2015,
Middlebury College, the University of Southern California, and Univer-
sity of California, San Diego were all ordered to reinstate expelled stu-
dents.63 Nearly fifty lawsuits by accused students are in process, an in-
crease from roughly twelve in 2013. 4 Young men are as unhappy with
the outcome of college investigations as their accusers, and often, both
sides find the process unfair.6 5 In a June, 2016 report issued by the Amer-
ican Association of University Professors (AAUP), incorrect OCR inter-
pretation and overzealous administrative implementation were described
as the cause of undue restrictions on teaching, research, speech, academ-
ic freedom, and due process.66 The AAUP argued that both the university
response and the criminal justice system serve "neither survivors nor
alleged perpetrators with any notable degree of fairness."67 The core due
process arguments advanced include (1) a lack of a hearing with (2) the
right to confrontation and cross-examination and (3) incorrect use of the
preponderance of evidence standard of proof.68
An additional criticism against current Title IX enforcement is that
the Dear Colleague Letters are not merely interpretive, but instead prom-
ulgate new rules and requirements in violation of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.69 Considered interpretive rules, the Dear Colleague Letters
60. Newman & Sander, supra note 58, at A21.
61. See Libby Sander, Anti-Rape Activist, in The Chronicle List: This Year's Newsmakers,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 9, 2013, at A20.
62. Id.
63. Tovia Smith, For Students Accused of Campus Rape, Legal Victories Win Back Rights,
NPR.ORG (Oct. 15, 2015, 4:45 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/15/446083439/for-students-
accused-of-campus-rape-legal-victories-win-back-rights.
64. Id.
65. Robin Wilson, On New Front in Rape Debate, Student Tells Education Dept. His Side,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 20, 2014, at A 1l.
66. LIEBERWITZ ET AL., supra note 26, at 69, 82-87 (describing the use of role playing exer-
cises in a Deviance in U.S. Society course and other content that could trigger victims, mandating
reporting requirements in sexual harassment research activities, and describing freedom of speech
issues with anonymous technology apps and student publications).
67. Id at 90.
68. Id. at 79.
69. See Letter from Senator James Lankford to the Honorable John B. King, Jr., Acting Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Jan. 7, 2016),
http://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sen.%20Lankford%201etter%20to%2ODept.%200f
%20Education%201.7.16.pdf (discussing the rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure
792016]
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are defined by the Supreme Court as those "issued by an agency to ad-
vise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules
which it administers" that otherwise "do not have the force and effect of
law." 70 Despite lacking the force of law, courts pay them great atten-
tion.7 1 Recent letters from Oklahoma Senator James Lankford to the U.S.
Department of Education challenges the legitimacy of recent Dear Col-
league Letters by arguing they create substantive changes and require the
use of the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking procedures.72
With the election of Donald Trump, federal oversight of how col-
leges and universities handle sexual assault will likely subside or disap-
pear.73 The Republican Platform notes that sexual assault should be "in-
vestigated by civil authorities and prosecuted in a courtroom, not a facul-
ty lounge."7 4 Despite facing less enforcement from the federal govern-
ment, universities and colleges will likely still follow the letter and spirit
of Title IX as Title IX and the accompanying regulations will still be
obligatory. In sum, Title IX Coordinators address campus sexual mis-
conduct in an unstable but legalized environment that is characterized by
growing complaints, liability pressure, and specific directives from the
U.S. Department of Education's OCR.
Universities face a dilemma in determining how to create fair, con-
sistent, and reliable processes that respect the rights of both alleged per-
petrators and victims, while at the same time encouraging people to bring
complaints forward. Without active reporting and effective processes for
handling complaints, universities are unable to maintain a safe environ-
ment for all students. The difficulty of the dilemma is compounded by
the fact that universities are increasingly expected to change the culture
and norms shaping campus sexual misconduct so as to reduce the extent
of the problem. As will be described below, some measures to achieve
Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 553, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 553
(2012)).
70. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015).
71. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (di-
recting courts to defer to administrative interpretations of their authorizing legislation except when
those interpretations contravene the law).
72. Letter from Senator James Lankford to the Honorable John B. King, Jr., Acting Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Mar. 4, 2016),
http://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/3.4.1`6%20Lankford%201etter/`2Oto%2ODept.%20of
%20Education.pdf; Letter from Senator James Lankford to the Honorable John B. King, Jr., supra
note 69.
73. Robin Wilson, Trump Administration May Back Away from Title IX but Campuses Won't,




74. Jake New, Campus Sexual Assault in a Trump Era, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/11/10/trump-and-gop-likely-try-scale-back-title-ix-
enforcement-sexual-assault.
75. Wilson, supra note 73.
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these goals seem to require greater formality in procedures; some seem
to require greater informality.
C. Compliance Requires Both Formal and Informal Mechanisms
This Article examines how two university offices respond to the
confidentiality challenge of campus sexual misconduct. One is the long-
standing office of Ombuds, which by tradition and ethical norms has
been committed to using informal processes for hearing complaints. The
other is the office of Title IX Coordinator, which uses formalized pro-
cesses modeled in some ways on procedures used by prosecutors and
courts. Data collection comprised of a review of 1,200 documents and
interviews with fourteen Ombuds and thirteen Title IX Coordinators
from twenty-two large institutions of higher education. Conducted be-
tween 2011 and 2014, the research methods consisted of open-ended
interviews, content analysis of these interviews, and the analysis of doc-
uments relating to Title IX. The participants were from every region of
the country. Participants were primarily from large doctoral degree grant-
ing public and private research institutions, but several master's level
institutions were also included. The sensitive nature of the topic restrict-
ed the sample size. As the numbers interviewed grew, the stories and
commentary became repetitive. While it is possible that the twenty-seven
officials who agreed to be interviewed were somehow systematically
different from others who declined, I suspect that they were more typical
than unique. The participants, while relatively small in number, do not
appear to be systematically skewed in any obvious ways. These inter-
views provide insight into the nature of Title IX compliance between
2011 and 2014.
First, this Article describes the mandatory reporting requirements,
the current compliance regime in place at universities, and the Title IX
archetype that must, by nature, prioritize the interests of compliance over
those of confidentiality. Next the Article describes the limits of a compli-
ance regime, including the tensions between individual self-
determination and community safety and managerial efficiency versus
legal compliance. In each of these areas, Title IX Coordinators frequently
depart from the legal requirements of the role. Third, Ombuds are pro-
moted as a means of satisfying the underlying aims of Title IX. The ben-
efits of informal reporting options are described-specifically, the bene-
fits to the formal processes for providing individuals with confidentiality
and protecting the formal mechanism's independence and impartiality.
Essentially, Title IX Coordinators can retain their compliance function
with a well-designed informal mechanism. As described below, in reality
many Ombuds do not practice to the standards of the archetype, necessi-
tating reforms to ensure effective compliance.
The Article concludes that both formal and informal reporting
mechanisms are necessary and required to manage sexual misconduct
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disputes. Currently neither Ombuds nor Title IX Coordinators adhere to
their respective archetypes, resulting in increased liability risk to univer-
sities, fewer procedural choices for survivors and alleged perpetrators,
and processes that lack legitimacy. Fundamentally, in order to bring
complaints of misconduct out of the shadows, universities require
properly designed and executed formal and informal administrative
mechanisms. Simply put, universities require Ombuds-adhering to their
professional norms-in order to comply with Title IX.
I. REPORTING MISCONDUCT IN A COMPLIANCE REGIME
Title IX Coordinators promise confidentiality, but only to the extent
that it does not interfere with the law and interests of compliance.76 Put
simply, Coordinators give priority to reporting and compliance.77 As an
office of notice, for Coordinators, confidentiality is a relative concept
and is not given priority over compliance with mandatory reporting.78
This Section describes the Title IX Coordinator's archetypal obligations
and provides evidence of Title IX Coordinators complying with the mod-
el.
A. The Title IX Coordinator Archetype: Mandatory Reporting in a Com-
pliance Regime
Universities encourage mandatory reporting to support their interest
in bringing forward complaints of sexual misconduct, so the complaints
can be investigated, the perpetrators punished, and abuses deterred.79
Additionally, mandatory reporting limits potential exposure to liability.
The key question for Title IX Coordinators is whether it is appropriate
for organizational members without a recognized privilege (medical,
legal, religious, or psychological) to be exempt from mandatory report-
ing requirements. In order to bring as many complaints forward as possi-
ble, organizations often impose zero tolerance mandatory reporting re-
quirements.80 There is tension between preserving privacy and requiring
reporting by every employee so no complaint "slips through the
cracks."8' Specifically addressing the reporting question, David Miller
notes:
[W]ho could not want to see perpetrators of sexual violence or any
other kind of violence . .. exposed to the full consequence of their
76. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 147-49.
78. See infra text accompanying note 153.
79. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MICH. STATE UNIV., supra note 3, at 17; see also
infra text accompanying notes 83-88.
80. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MICH. STATE UNIV., supra note 3, at 19-20.
81. w. ScoTr LEWIS, SAUNDRA K. SCHUSTER, BRETT A. SOKOLOW & DANIEL C. SWINTON,
THE TOP TEN THINGS WE NEED TO KNOW ABOUT TITLE IX (THAT THE DCL DIDN'T TELL US) 10
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://www.ncherm.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/2013-NCHERM-Whitepaper-FINAL-1.18.13.pdf.
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actions, along with those who knowingly abet their horrible behav-
ior? Knowledge is responsibility, and those in the know must also be
held responsible for not acting on what they know if not acting be-
trays the public trust.82
In order to combat a culture of non-reporting, Title IX Coordinators
typically do not promise confidentiality to complainants. Confidentiality
impedes the public's right to know,83 contravenes the transparency of
courts, keeps critical information from people who most need to know,
and shields the institution from needing to provide oversight and ac-
countability.84 The Title IX Coordinator ensures compliance with Ti-
tle IX and reflects a compliance regime that seeks to prevent, elicit re-
ports of, and eliminate instances of sexual misconduct. All of this, in the
view of the Title IX model, requires disclosing information about com-
plaints to those who can act on that information. The Title IX Coordina-
tor archetype must be informed of all reports raising Title IX issues, even
if originally filed with or handled by another individual or office.85 Re-
porting requirements are waived for employees who are in a recognized
counseling relationship with a potential complainant.86
Most university policies provide for confidentiality to the extent al-
lowed by law, prohibit retaliation for making complaints, and allow the
institution to investigate incidents of which it has become aware without
a formal complaint.87 Further, in order to ensure that no incident goes
unattended, many colleges impose mandatory reporting requirements on
all faculty, staff, and employees.8 Title IX requires reporting from "re-
sponsible employees" or those with the authority to address and remedy
gender based discrimination, those with responsibility to report sexual
misconduct to a supervisor, or those a student would reasonably believe
must do either of the above.89 As an example of mandatory reporting
requirements, the Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process at the
University of Kansas specifies that all "unit heads and others who serve
in leadership roles in the university" are required to report discriminatory
82. David Miller, In Whom Can We Trust?, J. INT'L OMBUDSMAN Ass'N, 2011, at 6,6.
83. Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 947
(2006).
84. Laurie Kratky Dor6, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It's Time to Let Some Sun
Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI-KENT L. REV. 463, 465-66, 518-19 (2006).
85. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 24, at 16; OFFICE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 10-11.
86. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 22.
87. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MICH. STATE UNIV., supra note 3, at 14, 32, 34.
88. ATIXA Presentation: The 2013 ATIXA Campus Title IX Coordinator and Administrator
Training & Certification Course Materials 15 (Sept. 19-22, 2013) [hereinafter ATIXA Training &
Certification Course Materials], https://www.atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Title-
IX-Coordinator-Certification-Course-Materials.doc.
89. Id. at 107.
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actions.90 All deans, directors, administrators, supervisors, faculty mem-
bers, graduate teaching assistants, and academic advisors are required to
contact the Office of Institutional Opportunity and Access to initiate an
investigation if "they know or have reason to believe that discriminatory
practice(s) may have occurred."91 Similarly, Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity requires "with the exception of confidential support providers, all
Penn State employees are responsible employees and are obligated to
pass along information they learn about incidents of sexual misconduct
to the University's Title IX Coordinator."92 Harvard University notes:
[U]niversity officers, other than those who are prohibited from re-
porting because of a legal confidentiality obligation or prohibition
against reporting, must promptly notify the School or unit Title IX
Coordinator about possible sexual or gender-based harassment, re-
gardless of whether a complaint is filed. Such reporting is necessary
for various reasons, including to ensure that persons possibly subject-
ed to such conduct receive appropriate services and information; that
the University can track incidents and identify patterns; and that,
where appropriate, the University can take steps to protect the Har-
vard community.93
Mandatory reporting requirements put pressure on faculty members,
resident advisors, and others lacking a privilege, yet who promise priva-
cy or confidentiality to students approaching them for assistance. ATIXA
recommends that all employees report incidents of misconduct to the
Title IX Coordinator within twenty-four hours.94 Some non-supervisory
or non-responsible employees may be able to make anonymous reports
initially but may need to provide details later at the direction of the Ti-
tle IX Coordinator. OCR considers this category of reporter as "non-
professional counselors or advocates" and describes them as individuals
who work or volunteer in on-campus sexual assault centers, victim advo-
cacy offices, women's centers, or health centers, including front desk
staff and students.95 These individuals are required to "report only gen-
eral information about incidents of sexual violence such as the nature,
date, time, and general location of the incident and should take care to
avoid reporting personally identifiable information about a student."96
90. Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process. Who Must Report Discriminatory Ac-
tions?, U. KAN. POL'Y LIBR., http://policy.ku.edu/IOA/discrimination-complaint-
resolution#WhoMustReport (last updated Aug. 31, 2016).
91. Id.
92. A Note About Confidentiality, PA. ST. U., http://titleix.psu.edu/filing-a-report/ (last visited
Nov. 30, 2016).
93. FACULTY OF ARTS & Scis., HARVARD UNIV., SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED
HARASSMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR THE FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES HARVARD
UNIVERSITY 6 (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.fas.harvard.edu/files/fas/files/fassexual and gender-
based harassmentpolicy and procedures-1-13-16.pdfm=1453319539.
94. ATIXA Training & Certification Course Materials, supra note 88, at 108.
95. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 23.
96. Id. at 24.
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Notably, ATIXA's Training Manual notes: "No employee should
ever promise absolute confidentiality, though some (such as licensed
counselors) are better able to protect information than others (though
even licensed counselors, etc. have some situations where they must re-
port if they have a duty to warn). Ombuds are not exempt from expecta-
tions of reporting."97 The ATIXA Training Manual further states that all
employees should be trained that "reports are private, but not confiden-
tial (unless made to a confidential resource)" and how to "convey this to
victims without chilling the victim's willingness to report. It takes tact,
but it can be done."98 As a result, the model Title IX Coordinator is a
private, but not necessarily confidential, office of notice and investiga-
tion.
Fundamentally, Title IX Coordinators cannot guarantee confidenti-
ality. A directive in the University of Kansas Discrimination Complaint
Resolution Process notes
The Office of Institutional Opportunity and Access will handle all
discrimination and harassment complaints discreetly but cannot guar-
antee confidentiality or anonymity because the University has an ob-
ligation to investigate complaints of discrimination and harassment
and to maintain a safe environment, free from harassment and dis-
crimination. Because of its obligations under the law, KU will not be
able to honor all requests for confidentiality or all requests that a
complaint not be pursued.99
Harvard's Title IX procedures state, "Information will be disclosed
in this manner only to those at the University who, in the judgment of the
Title IX Officer or School or unit Title IX Coordinator, have a need to
know."100
Therefore, complainants wishing to report, but not participate in the
ensuing investigation-or avoid an investigation altogether-may not
have a choice to not participate. The ATIXA Training Manual notes that
colleges are required "at minimum [to conduct] an investigation in all
cases, to determine the extent of the harassment, the acuity of the threat it
represents to students, and what might be necessary to put an end to
it."' 1 Confidentiality is thus a secondary goal to following and comply-
ing with the law. Coordinator archetypes are offices of notice, which
officially makes the institution they represent aware of, and thus respon-
sible for, any complaints or reports of sexual misconduct. The ATIXA
Training Manual describes these confidentiality responsibilities as a "co-
97. ATIXA Training & Certification Course Materials, supra note 88, at 108-09.
98. Id. at 109.
99. Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process: Confidentiality, U. KAN. POL'Y LIBR.,
http://policy.ku.eduiIOA/discrimination-complaint-resolution#confidentiality (last updated Aug. 31,
2016).
100. FACULTY OF ARTS & SCIS., supra note 93, at 6.
101. ATIXA Training & Certification Course Materials, supra note 88, at 14.
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nundrum" because "[i]nstitutional authorities who have notice of alleged
sexual assaults/harassment are not likely to be able to keep those inci-
dents completely confidential, as a result of the institution's affirmative
obligation to investigate and act to resolve the incident."l02 This tension
between protecting confidentiality and fulfilling the obligations of Ti-
tle IX is evident in the ATIXA Training Manual: "The privacy of all
parties to a complaint of sexual misconduct must be respected, except
insofar as it interferes with the university's obligation to fully investigate
allegations of sexual misconduct."'1
03
While complainant's confidentiality must be considered, it is sec-
ondary to the goal of compliance and campus safety. The OCR 2014
Q&A document states, "OCR strongly supports a student's interest in
confidentiality in cases involving sexual violence. There are situations in
which a school must override a student's request for confidentiality in
order to meet its Title IX obligations."'0 Such instances should be "lim-
ited and the information should only be shared with individuals who are
responsible for handling the school's response to incidents of sexual vio-
lence."05 Recognizing the potential for damage to the integrity and trust
in the process, OCR mandates that, "[t]o improve trust in the process for
investigating sexual violence complaints, a school must notify students
of the information that will be disclosed, to whom it will be disclosed,
and why."1 06 Most notably, OCR recognizes the detrimental impact of
breaching confidentiality: "A school should be aware that disregarding
requests for confidentiality can have a chilling effect and discourage oth-
er students from reporting sexual violence.',io7
When complainants insist their identifiable information not be dis-
closed, schools must inform survivors of its limited ability to respond
and of a prohibition against retaliation.'os Complainants still preferring
anonymity require schools to "evaluate the request in the context of the
school's responsibility to provide a safe and nondiscriminatory environ-
ment for all students."09 Because the Title IX Coordinator must have
knowledge of all complaints, OCR notes that this individual is in the best
position "to evaluate a student's request for confidentiality in the context
of the school's responsibility to provide a safe and nondiscriminatory
environment for all students."'lo
102. Id at 15.
103. Id at 31.
104. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 18-19.




109. Id. at 17.
110. Id. at 11.
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The ATIXA Training Manual also provides guidance to Title IX
Coordinators on how to handle requests for confidentiality. Where survi-
vors are reluctant to make formal complaints, or withdraw formal com-
plaints, the request should be honored and efforts need to be made "to
persuade (not coerce) the alleged victim to reconsider," including re-
minding the person that (1) the institution will vigorously enforce its
retaliation policy, (2) if he/she does not act, the perpetrator may harm
someone else, (3) they can take time to consider and come back to make
a decision, and (4) interim accommodations can be used to make report-
ing easier.' If a survivor refuses to file a formal complaint or will not
allow his or her name to be revealed, a decision must be made "on
whether sufficient threat is present to warrant an investigation independ-
ent of the cooperation of the alleged victim." 1 2
Confidentiality is related to the Title IX Coordinator archetype's re-
porting requirements. The Clery Act requires all colleges and universities
that participate in federal financial aid programs to keep and disclose
information about crime on and near their respective campuses.1"3 For
example, schools must publish policies designed to prevent sexual vio-
lence and respond to it once it occurs.114 These policies must include
specific information about (1) reporting,115 (2) the survivor's right to
notify law enforcement and receive school assistance in doing so,"6 (3)
instructions to survivors as how to preserve evidence of sexual vio-
lence,"7 (4) information about options and assistance for changing living
and educational arrangement,"8 and (5) disciplinary procedures that ex-
plicitly treat accuser and accused equally in terms of having others pre-
sent at hearings and to know disciplinary outcomes."l9
In 2014, federal regulations clarified the 2013 Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) reauthorization requirements relating to confiden-
tiality.1 20 Specifically, they require institutions to maintain statistics (in-
cluding numbers of unfounded crime reports), to educate incoming stu-
dents and new employees, to engage in ongoing awareness campaigns, to
describe disciplinary proceedings in detail, to detail a list of possible
sanctions, and to indicate the range of protective measures the institution
may offer.121
111. ATIXA Training & Certification Course Materials, supra note 88, at 53-54.
112. Id. at 54.
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1), (a)(1)(0) (2012).
114. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(A)(i)-(ii).
115. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iii).
116. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iii)(I11)(aa)-(bb).
117. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iii)(I).
118. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(vii).
119. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iv).




The Family Educational Rights and. Privacy Act (FERPA) guaran-
tees student rights to confidentiality and impacts the handling of sexual
misconduct complaints.122 Specifically, FERPA protects against the un-
authorized disclosure of confidential student education records. It grants
parents of minor-aged students and students eighteen and older the right
to access educational records, to challenge the records' contents, and to
have control over disclosure of personally identifiable information in the
records.123 In terms of its impact on campus sexual misconduct, schools
must inform the complainant that if she (or he) wishes to file a formal
complaint, the school cannot ensure confidentiality. Conversely, if the
complainant wishes to maintain her (or his) confidentiality, the school
must inform the complainant that the school's ability to address the prob-
lem may be limited because investigators will be precluded from giving
the complainant's identity to the alleged perpetrator and this will fore-
close a full investigation of the complaint.124 Accordingly, the school
should weigh complainant requests for confidentiality against the follow-
ing factors: the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, the complainant's
age, any complaints about the same individual, and the alleged harasser's
right to receive information about the allegations if the information is
maintained as an "education record" under FERPA.125 The Federal Gov-
ernment provides specific guidance on the intersection between Title IX,
FERPA, and the Clery Act. 126 Notably, where FERPA and Title IX con-
flict, "the requirements of title IX override any conflicting FERPA provi-
,,127sion.
To comply with this maze of regulation, the ATIXA Training Man-
ual notes Coordinators are to "[o]rganize and maintain grievance files,
disposition reports, and other records regarding Title IX compliance,
including annual reports of the number and nature of filed complaints
and the disposition of said complaints, data collection, climate assess-
ment, [and] pattern monitoring."1 2 8 This reporting and data collection
requirement affects the confidentiality of shared information and requires
formal record keeping relating to confidentiality. For example, the
ATIXA Training Manual notes that interviewers should not promise ab-
solute confidentiality, that complainants should sign a statement hat they
understand the process and that complainants should sign a consent
122. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012); see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.33 (2012).
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.33.
124. Gary Pavela & Daniel Swinton, Presentation for Magna Online Seminars: Resolving
Sexual Violence Allegations: OCR Guidance and the Law 3 (June 16, 2011).
125. Id. at 2.
126. Intersection of Title IX and the Clery Act, NAT'L CTR. CAMPUS PUB. SAFETY,
http://www.nccpsafety.org/assets/files/library/Intersection-of Title IX Clery.pdf (last visited Nov.
13, 2016) (outlining a side-by-side comparison, the purpose of which is "to clarify the reporting
requirements of Title IX and the Clery Act in cases of sexual violence and to resolve any concerns
about apparent conflicts between the two laws").
127. Id.
128. ATIXA Training & Certification Course Materials, supra note 88, at 5-6.
88 [Vol. 94:1
OUT FROM THE SHADOWS
statement acknowledging that the complaint may be revealed to the ac-
cused student and to witnesses as necessary.129 The person making the
complaint should sign this consent, and "[i]f s/he does not, s/he is not
entitled to view the complaint."1 30 Further, intake officers "should stress
the need to get the complaint in writing, and can write the complaint,
solicit the written complaint from the complainant, or assist the com-
plainant in writing the complaint.",13
Where the individual's privacy is not absolutely protected by the
model Title IX Coordinator, it will be controlled on a "need-to-know"
basis.'32 Report of an allegation that includes evidence that a felony has
occurred must be reported to the local police (although this does not
mean that charges will automatically be filed or that the survivor must
speak with police).133 Where there is not conclusive evidence of a felony,
victims have
[t]he right to be informed by university officials of options to notify
proper law enforcement authorities, including on-campus and local
police, and the option to be assisted by campus authorities in notify-
ing such authorities, if the [victim] so chooses. This also includes the
right not to report, if this is the victim's desire. 134
This right not to report does not include the institutional require-
ment to report any incidents without personally identifiable information
in its campus crime report.135
In situations where the survivor does not want the institution to pur-
sue an investigation, the threat must be low enough to not require adjudi-
cation. Nonetheless, ATIXA guidance cautions "college officials would
be well advised to fully document their conclusion, supported by an ap-
propriate investigation, and ask the victim to acknowledge that he/she
concurs with the college's conclusion, and asks that no further action be
taken."'136 Further, a letter to the survivor "should indicate that his/her
refusal to cooperate with investigators and campus conduct personnel
may prevent the college from pursuing the complaint to resolution."37
In sum, the Title IX Coordinator archetype does not promise abso-
lute confidentiality because there is a responsibility to address known
problems, which requires sharing information with others who can ad-
dress the problem. The model Title IX Coordinator addresses complain-
129. Id. at 53.
130. Id. at 56.
131. Id at 52.
132. Id. at 31-32.
133. Id. at 32.
134. Id. at 46.
135. Id. at 31-32.




ants' interest in confidentiality by seeking as much as possible to respect
complainants' wishes and to provide privacy-but where these interests
conflict with addressing a known and serious problem, the Title IX Co-
ordinator archetype is to give priority to addressing the problem. Title IX
Coordinators reflect a compliance regime that seeks to elicit formal com-
plaints and then discipline, prevent, and eliminate instances of sexual
misconduct. The next Part provides evidence that many Title IX Coordi-
nators adhere to the compliance archetype.
B. Compliance over Confidentiality: Title IX Coordinators Adhering to
the Archetype
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype act as offices of
notice and investigation and require employees who are designated as
mandatory reporters to provide the office with information. These Ti-
tle IX Coordinators also prioritize compliance over confidentiality and
maintain and use records necessary to ensure a quality investigation.
First, these Title IX Coordinators emphasize their role as offices of no-
tice. For example, one Title IX Coordinator explained, "[T]his is not the
office to come and vent. We have those offices. . .. If you want to talk,
you go there, because you're putting the university on notice when you
come to me [and I need to do something about it]. So I make that distinc-
tion upfront."1 3 8
Second, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype require
other university employees to provide their office with information about
violations. In order to comply with Title IX, Coordinators must actively
seek to elicit reports about any and all incidents of sexual misconduct.
This requires that all employees be informed of the obligation to report
information about sexual misconduct. For example, a Coordinator de-
scribed mandatory reporters as "[a]nybody with any information [includ-
ing an Ombuds], [who must make a report] on anything associated with
discrimination [or] sexual misconduct [or anything required by
law] . . . .""9 Title IX Coordinators described these reporting require-
ments as mandatory for an effective institutional response:
If [a complainant] start[s] at the police department, [the police] have
a connection and work very closely with us to make sure we get the
information we need once that person makes contact with
them ... [and the] dean of students does the same [for the police]. So
we have a very good collaborative working relationship that all of us
138. Interviewee 1, T1OA9:35-41. Note that the latter part of citations referring to "Interview-
ees" as part of my confidential study indicate page and line numbers of transcripts and are included
for my own records.
139. Interviewee 2, T4A8:28-30.
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at some point will be notified of a concern so that we can all do what
we need to do to resolve it. 140
Title IX Coordinators observed that there is growing interest in re-
porting on their campuses due to the increasing importance of the issue.
Thus, one said,
Every time anybody says anything that just is remotely connected to
some sort of Title IX issue, [administrators had] all read the Dear
Colleague Letter, but they didn't really know what we were doing be-
fore. . . . [and] it just put everyone in a tizzy and it's sort of been in-
teresting politically because . . . you can feel a political tug there
where they really want to be in charge of it. Kind of . .. because it's a
new and scary frontier and that's a career maker if you're 35 [years
old] and have your PhD and you're looking to move up in the organi-
zation .... They call me about the slightest thing that any young
woman says. Any little thing, "We just thought we should refer this
[to] you."'41
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype do not exempt
anyone from reporting unless it is required by law-and this includes
Ombuds. For example, an Ombuds noted a requirement to call the Title
IX Coordinator and say "'Here is the situation, would you be comforta-
ble if we try to resolve it informally?' And if [the Title IX Coordinator]
thinks that it's okay, we can do it and if [the Title IX Coordinator]
doesn't, we can't." 4 2 Another Ombuds noted the lack of a good working
relationship with the Title IX Coordinator because "they think we're on
their turf. . . . [t]hey think they should be handling it all." 43
Coordinators following the archetype prefer anonymous complaints
to not reporting. As one observed,
[E]ven if we are unable to use the situation directly, [fjirst thing we
try to do is make sure that there's an education that comes on the
heels of [a complaint]. .. . [To ask] "when are you having your next
faculty meeting?" or staff meeting if it's involving staff, or if it's not,
if it's a fraternity or something like that, "when can we provide some
education around [sexual misconduct]?"
Another Coordinator described creating a system that allows for
anonymous reporting and how the Title IX office investigates anony-
mous complaints:
We'll go as far as we can go [investigating anonymous complaints],
but if we receive information, and we think we have enough infor-
140. Interviewee 3, TI3A10:12-18.
141. Interviewee 4, TI2All:22-32.
142. Interviewee 5, 014B9:16-18.
143. Interviewee 6, 09B13:16-18.
144. Interviewee 7, T5A9:18-22.
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mation to take some action in terms of looking into some of the con-
cerns, we'll definitely do that. And we'll go as far as we can go. It's
very difficult not having the person [who complained], so, in terms of
resolution there may not be very much that can be done, but certainly
we'll investigate it, we'll look into it and we'll see if there's any evi-
dence to suggest that what the person has claimed . . . has validity. If
so, we'll maybe try to take some action [to remediate, even if only
providing] some education ... .145
Other Coordinators who adhere to the compliance archetype prefer
detailed rather than general information. For example, an Ombuds de-
scribed the Title IX Coordinator's preferences:
The [formal office director] is an attorney [who] just wants the facts.
I can't single out ... three departments [with one being the potential
culprit]. If [I am asked] how come they got singled out, what am I
going to say? [The formal office director] tells me, "[e]ither we give
training to the whole campus or we don't, and we don't have the re-
sources to do it for the whole campus so it ain't gonna happen. Now,
if you have a victim, I want to see them, you send them to me, and
we'll start an investigation and we'll follow the numbers, but in the
absence of that I don't want to hear about it." 146
Third, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype give prior-
ity to compliance over confidentiality because they must, above all else,
comply with Title IX law and policy. Compliance requires that they give
priority to compliance over confidentiality. For example, a Coordinator
said she tells visitors "[w]hat you say here is confidential to the extent
allowable by law."147 Another Coordinator explained,
[It's important to inform] the person that you're not a confidential re-
source and there are times when the institution has to act or chooses
to act even if it's not what he or she wants. I do my best to explain
why and keep their concerns at the center of what our plan is so they
can inform [our approach] as we move forward.148
Another Coordinator echoed the above observations:
I tell people that I cannot guarantee confidentiality, but I can promise
them discretion and that only those with a need to know will know
that we have confidential records, [and] that I take their privacy very
seriously. But because there are some issues involved I cannot guar-
antee that I will not have to tell someone.149
145. Interviewee 3, TI 3A7:42-8:5.
146. Interviewee 8, 1O0B13:22-29.
147. Interviewee 1, TIOA7:19-20.
148. Interviewee 9, T8A5:31-34.
149. Interviewee 4, T12A9:8-1 1.
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Many Coordinators attempt to provide a "warning" to visitors about the
Coordinator's obligation to conduct an investigation. Thus, one ob-
served,
[W]e let them know that we have an obligation to the institution to
conduct an investigation if we learn something that we think needs to
be investigated, whether they want to file a complaint or not. It's very
common for people to come here and say "I want to tell you about
something, but I don't want an investigation done." We stop them in
their tracks and tell them "look, it's not up to you whether we con-
duct an investigation or not." So it's very clear to them what the obli-
gations [are] on our part. Sometimes people walk away. We try to
have them not walk away, we want to investigate if something's
wrong, but sometimes we have no choice.150
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype require participation
in the investigation. As one observed,
We have in our policy that failure to cooperate with an investigation
can [result in] disciplinary action. And that is in there for people who
either falsify information [or] flat out refuse to cooperate with an in-
vestigation.. . . So if someone [has] information, [and] I know they
have information, [and] they refuse to cooperate or come in and don't
provide full cooperation and I [can] prove [it], then you're going to
be disciplined for it. In other words . . . this is a responsibility . . . to
make sure the process works. So if you're not going to be part of the
process, then we're going to have to deal with that. I don't want to
have to deal with the discipline, I just want . .. you cooperating and
giving me the information and giving me true and accurate infor-
mation. Then you're done. I'm giving you the word that no one is go-
ing to know what you told me until and unless it is subpoenaed. I
rarely [have that happen as] . . . most attorneys . . . want to do their
own depositions and everything. ... We're going to protect your in-
formation, but you're going to give me that information. If you don't
give me the information, and you're just refusing to do that, I'm go-
ing to discipline you because you're not going to put a spoke in the
wheel of this process.
There are, of course, exceptions to the requirement to participate in
the process, but these illustrate the general rule described by a Coordina-
tor:
[I]f a person is named in any way in an investigation, yes, they are
required to participate in the process. . . . [Although] sometimes we
make exceptions for the complainant, it depends on the situa-
tion.... [W]ith Title IX cases if we do an investigation, there is the
possibility that the investigator can go to the hearing and testify
150. Interviewee 10, T7A9:17-29.
151. Interviewee 1, T1OA12:1-22.
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based on their investigation and their findings, which would not force
the complainant to have to [testify]. So there are ways, depending on
the situation . .. in which the complainant may not have to participate
in the [formal] process if they do not wish to. Of course, if they don't
want to pursue a case, then we are bound to support their wishes un-
less there's some threat to the campus why we must move forward.152
Another Coordinator sums up the priority of investigation over confiden-
tiality:
I never promise them confidentiality. But I still investigate as much
as I possibly can, with or without their cooperation, because if they
tell me, and I do nothing, then they can come back and say "hey,
[that person is] the office of notice and I told [them], and whether I
participated or not, [she is] showing deliberate indifference to my
complaint. [She] didn't check to see if I was telling the truth, [She]
didn't check to see if there were other people," so I'm not going
down that road. I'm not going to jail for anybody.153
Fourth, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype use and
maintain records in order to ensure a documented investigation. A Title
IX Coordinator described effective record keeping as necessary to ensur-
ing correct information: "We summarize [the complainant's statement]
and then we send them a summary of their allegations and ask them if
they agree with them, if they have anything they want to add."l5 4 A simi-
lar process is used by other Coordinators, who "write [the allegations]
down, then type it up, we send it out, [and ask the respondent o] please
make any corrections .... ."5 Typically the name of the complainant and
the summary of the complaint are then provided to the alleged offender,
to make them "fully aware" of the situation."' Several Coordinators ex-
pressed frustration at the gossip and breaches of confidentiality that make
investigating difficult:
[E]ven though the campus is huge, it's still small [and] people hear
everything. There is no confidentiality on this campus. Let me repeat
that: none. None at all. As soon as a phone call is made, as soon as
somebody makes a complaint, every-fricken-body on campus knows
about it. . . . It makes my investigation hard because I have to figure
out what is it you know and what it is you were told and I have to
separate opinion from fact.157
In sum, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetypal model
give priority to the organizational interest in investigation and enforce-
152. Interviewee 3, T13A8:10-21.
153. Interviewee 11, T1IA7:12-19.
154. Interviewee 3, TI3A9:18-19.
155. Interviewee 1, TIOA8:20-21.
156. Interviewee 1, T1OA8:13.
157. Interviewee 11, TI IAl3:36-39, 15:11-13.
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ment over the complainant's interest in influencing the course of the pro-
cess and confidentiality. In reality, just as many Title IX Coordinators
interviewed between 2011 and 2014 departed from the compliance ar-
chetype. The next Section describes the limits of coercive compliance
and the tension between individual and organizational interests.
II. THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE COMPLIANCE
A. The Limited Effectiveness of Coercive Compliance
In their conceptualization of power as the ability to influence, John
French and Bertram Raven identified legitimacy as one of five bases of
power; the other four were reward, coercion, expertise, and reference.158
Raven later included information as an additional basis of power.159 Us-
ing coercion as the basis of power, the deterrence model of compliance
dominates law and public policy.1 60 Focusing on the power of legal au-
thorities to shape behavior through the use of negative sanctions for rule
breaking, punishment is seen as critical to deter people from criminal
behavior.'6 ' The deterrence model is closely related to rational choice
theory and neoclassical economics162 as it creates the prospect of heavy
losses that will outweigh any anticipated gains of engaging in criminal
behavior. While research shows that people's behavior is often shaped by
their estimate of the likelihood of being caught and punished if they dis-
obey the law, 16 3 research also shows these likelihood perceptions have a
relatively minor influence on behavior and, thus, the deterrence model
has had limited success.6
The main problem with the deterrence model is that it requires near-
constant surveillance of individual behavior as rule breakers have a
strong motivation to hide illegal behavior.165 The use of surveillance
leads people to experience such intrusions as unjust and to create adver-
158. John R. P. French, Jr. & Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN
SOCIAL POWER 150, 150-67 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1959).
159. See Jojanneke van der Toorn, Tom R. Tyler & John T. Jost, More than Fair: Outcome
Dependence, System Justification, and the Perceived Legitimacy of Authority Figures, 47 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 127, 128-29, 129 n.4 (2011).
160. Tom R. Tyler & John T. Jost, Psychology and the Law: Reconciling Normative and De-
scriptive Accounts of Social Justice and System Legitimacy, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF
BASIC PRINCIPLES 807, 809 (Arie W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins eds., 2d ed. 2007).
161. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REv. 413,
425, 436 (1999).
162. See generally ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, JACQUELINE COHEN & DANIEL NAGIN, DETERRENCE
AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES
(1978).
163. See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, The Preventive Effects of the Per-
ceived Risk of Arrest: Testing an Expanded Concept of Deterrence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 561, 562
(1991); Raymond Paternoster, Decisions to Participate in and Desist from Four Types of Common
Delinquency: Deterrence and the Rational Choice Perspective, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 7, 8 (1989).
164. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 460-
63 (1997); Tyler & Jost, supra note 160, at 810.
165. Tyler & Jost, supra note 160, at 810.
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sarial relationships between legal authorities and community members,
especially racial and ethnic minorities.' 66 The result is a public less com-
pliant with both the law and assisting the police.167 Evidence indicates
the deterrence model works best for crimes in which a prospective rule
breaker weighs the expected costs and benefits.168 Short-term reductions
in crime have been observed due to changes in laws that create greater
media exposure and thus increased estimates of being caught and pun-
ished.169 Crimes committed while intoxicated are likewise unaffected by
deterrence strategies.170 Ultimately, people complying only with coercive
power are seen to be less likely to obey the law in the future '7 as it di-
minishes internal motivation to obey the law.1 72
The legal system depends on the consent of citizens to cooperate
with legal authorities.173 Cooperation is most likely to occur if people
view the law as (1) determined and implemented through procedurally
fair means, and (2) consistent with moral values.174 Ultimately the legit-
imacy of legal authorities is essential to greater compliance and coopera-
tion. Fundamentally a "law enforcement frame" requires a focus on the
"adequacy of the prosecution of perpetrators of sexual assault."',7
The current compliance regime is ineffective due to (1) the funda-
mental tension between individual self-determination and organizational
interests in safety and avoiding liability, (2) the current university culture
of non-reporting, and (3) a crisis of legitimacy as neither survivors nor
alleged perpetrators trust universities to effectively handle sexual mis-
conduct disputes. Each of these issues is now reviewed in turn.
1. The Fundamental Tension
Confidentiality and the reporting of sexual misconduct illustrate the
tension between self-determination and organizational interests. By en-
suring confidentiality, officials serve the values of encouraging people to
report misconduct, assisting survivors in getting any needed support, and
providing survivors with self-determination in maintaining control re-
garding what will happen with the complaint. This view was best ex-
166. See ToM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 204-08 (2002).
167. See Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in
Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 513, 534-37 (2003).
168. Tyler & Jost, supra note 160, at 809-10.
169. See id. at 810.
170. See id. at 811.
171. Id. at 812.
172. TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 44 (2000).
173. Tyler & Jost, supra note 160, at 813.
174. Id.
175. Katharine Silbaugh, Reactive to Proactive: Title IX's Unrealized Capacity to Prevent
Campus Sexual Assault, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1068 (2015).
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pressed in the Report of the White House Task Force to Protect Students
from Sexual Assault:
Sexual assault survivors respond in different ways. Some are ready to
make a formal complaint right away, and want their school to move
swiftly to hold the perpetrator accountable. Others, however, aren't
so sure. Sexual assault can leave victims feeling powerless-and they
need support from the beginning to regain a sense of control. Some,
at least at first, don't want their assailant (or the assailant's friends,
classmates, teammates or club members) to know they've reported
what happened. But they do want someone on campus to talk to-
and many want to talk in confidence, so they can sort through their
options at their own pace. If victims don't have a confidential place
to go, or think a school will launch a full-scale investigation against
their wishes, many will stay silent. In recent years, some schools
have directed nearly all their employees (including those who typi-
cally offer confidential services, like rape crisis and women's cen-
ters) to report all the details of an incident to school officials-which
can mean that a survivor quickly loses control over what happens
next. That practice, however well-intentioned, leaves survivors with
fewer places to tum.176
On the one hand, an individual who feels she has been subjected to
sexual harassment or assault has a strong interest in shaping whether and
how the university pursues an investigation and disciplinary action in
response to her grievance. Often, these individuals do not even file a
complaint because they fear losing control of the process.
By contrast, universities have a strong interest in vigorously inves-
tigating these cases and carrying out discipline when it is merited. This
interest serves the value of setting clear norms, punishing bad actors, and
deterring future misconduct. Each university holds an interest in protect-
ing the broader university community from sexual misconduct. That in-
terest also serves the value of protecting the university from liability for
failing to do enough to stamp out misconduct. In pursuit of these goals, a
university will often want to investigate and discipline even if the com-
plainant does not. Reconciling these tensions is difficult.
The benefits of confidentiality especially conflict with the principle
of mandatory reporting. The values served by mandatory reporting are to
set clear norms against sexual violence by encouraging reporting, punish-
ing bad behavior, and deterring future misconduct. These organizational
values also serve to protect the organization from liability. Confidentiali-
ty and control over the complaint encourages individuals to report, but a
culture of under-reporting requires the institution to surface as many
176. THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra
note 53, at 11.
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complaints as possible in order to ensure compliance and change cultural
norms.
Mandatory reporting policies are often designed to trigger the use of
formal mechanisms.177 Zero tolerance policies often create a tension be-
tween efficiently solving problems at the lowest level (e.g., "by helping
people act on their own") and establishing "complete control over all
unacceptable behavior by centralizing conflict management."1 7 8 Essen-
tially, the question of settlement versus precedent is also one about indi-
vidual self-determination versus organizational interests. Settling a com-
plaint through a mutual agreement rather than an official determination
serves the interests of individual self-determination over how a dispute is
handled, privacy, and efficiency. Settlement may also serve an institu-
tional interest in avoiding publicity and public liability. By contrast,
making an official decision regarding a complaint establishes a precedent
and this serves the interest in setting clear norms regarding sexual mis-
conduct. These precedents may clearly send the message that misconduct
will not be tolerated. Navigating the tension between individual self-
determination and organizational interests in safety and avoiding liability
places Title IX Coordinators in difficult situations given the current cul-
ture of non-reporting.
2. A Culture of Non-Reporting and a Crisis of Legitimacy
Despite the Title IX compliance regime, evidence indicates sexual
misconduct is widely underreported. A 2007 survey indicated that only
16% of physically forced survivors and 8% of incapacitated sexual as-
sault survivors contacted a survivor's, crisis, or health care center after
the incident.179 Only 2% of incapacitated survivors and 13% of physical-
ly forced survivors report the incident to law enforcement.180 Other stud-
ies estimate that 90% or more of survivors of campus sexual assault do
not report the incident.'8 1 A 2015 study of twenty-seven institutions of
higher education found "[a] relatively small percentage (e.g., 28% or
less) of even the most serious incidents are reported."'82
Evidence indicates non-reporting occurs due to a fear of reprisal and
a belief the process will not work or not be fair.' 83 In a 2001 survey of
graduate students, 21% of those experiencing harassment reported the
behavior, 30% experienced retaliation after reporting, and 58% believed
177. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 24, at 2.
178. Mary Rowe, Linda Wilcox & Howard Gadlin, Dealing with-or Reporting-
"Unacceptable" Behavior, J. INT'L OMBUDSMAN ASS'N, 2009, at 52, 57.
179. KREBS ET AL., supra note 12, at xvii.
180. Id.
181. BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL., NAT'L INST. JUSTICE & BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS, THE
SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN 23-24 (2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/182369.pdf.
182. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 8, at iv.
183. FISHER ET AL., supra note 181, at 23-24.
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the reporting process and complaint handling could be improved. 184 Ac-
cording to a 2015 study, "[m]ore than 50% of victims of even the most
serious incidents (e.g., forced penetration) do not report because they do
not consider it serious enough."185
Relationship dynamics make it more difficult for survivors to come
forward. Most perpetrators of rape or attempted rape are known to the
survivor, including classmates and friends (70% of completed rapes), and
boyfriends or ex-boyfriends (23.7% of completed rates and 14.5% of
attempted rapes).186 The decentralized environment, the focus on aca-
demic pursuits, and the hierarchical intellectual environment allow har-
assing behaviors to go unchecked in academic institutions.18 7
In part, the problem is due to a crisis of legitimacy. Neither survi-
vors nor alleged perpetrators trust universities to effectively handle sexu-
al misconduct disputes. The university context for sexual misconduct
requires institutions take action to remediate the effects of sexual mis-
conduct. In a 2014 survey of more than 300 schools, commissioned by
Senator Claire McCaskill, "[m]ore than 40% of U.S. colleges and univer-
sities have conducted no investigations of sexual assault[] [allegations]
over the last five years."'8 8 Further, the survey found that only 16% of
schools conduct "climate surveys" to determine the prevalence of sexual
assault on campus, and only about half of colleges have a hotline that
survivors can call to report a sexual assault.'89 Nearly 73% of schools do
not have protocols for how campus authorities and local law enforcement
should work together on cases.190
Perceptions of organizational tolerance to sexual harassment are
significantly related to the frequency of sexual harassment incidents and
the effectiveness in combating the problem.191 Organizationally, studies
reveal that where a choice of sanctions for harassment is available, it is
common for the least stringent to be selected, such as a formal or infor-
mal warning without further action.192 Such responses indicate a deflec-
184. STUDENT CONFLICT RESOLUTION CTR., UNIV. OF MINN., ACADEMIC INCIVILITY AND THE
GRADUATE/PROFESSIONAL STUDENT EXPERIENCE: SUMMARY OF SPRING 2011 SURVEY OF UMN-
TC GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL STUDENTS 5 (2011),
http://www.sos.umn.edu/assets/pdf/Survey%20Summary%202011`%20(revised%208-12- 1l).pdf.
185. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 8, at iv (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. FISHER ET AL., supra note 181, at 19.
187. Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Workplace Harassment in the Academic Environ-
ment, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 81, 83 (2011).
188. Mary Beth Marklein & Deirdre Shesgreen, Colleges Ignoring Sexual Assault, Senator
Charges, USA TODAY (July 9, 2014, 5:51 PM), http://usat.ly/ImfL6Cf.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Miner-Rubino & Cortina, supra note 19, at 109; Nelson, Halpert & Cellar, supra note 19,
at 812.
192. Salin, supra note 20, at 40.
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tion of organizational responsibility and may indicate a "climate of toler-
ance." 193
The legitimacy crisis has also led to a proliferation of complaints
and lawsuits. In January of 2013, student Andrea Pino, two other stu-
dents, an alumna, and a former administrator made a federal complaint
against the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill accusing the uni-
versity of negligently handling its responses to rape.194 Students else-
where filed similar complaints against Amherst, Berkeley, Dartmouth,
Occidental, Swarthmore, Vanderbilt and other universities.'95 In 2014,
the University of Connecticut announced it would pay nearly $1.3 mil-
lion to settle a federal lawsuit filed by five current and former female
undergraduate students claiming the university had mishandled their sex-
ual assault complaints.'96 In 2016, Florida State agreed to pay $950,000
to settle a federal lawsuit with an accuser of quarterback Jameis Win-
ston.197
Students accused of sexual misconduct are also filing complaints.
Daniel Kopin, a former student at Brown University, sent a letter to the
U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights, sharing his side
of a sexual encounter that resulted in his suspension.198 In June 2013,
Peter Yu sued Vassar College, arguing that the college denied him due
process throughout the sexual misconduct disciplinary process and had
discriminated against him because of his sex.'99 Specifically, Yu claimed
officials did not properly advise him of grievance policies and did not
allow him legal representation at the disciplinary hearing.200 Similar
complaints were filed against St. Joseph's University in July 2013, and a
federal lawsuit was filed against Xavier University in August 2013,
claiming that the university conducted a fundamentally unfair hearing.201
These three lawsuits all share several allegations in common: campus
officials withheld key evidence in hearings, were hasty to rush to judg-
ment, and a general presumption of guilt prevailed.202 In 2015, Middle-
bury College, the University of Southern California, and University of
California, San Diego were all ordered to reinstate expelled students.203
193. McDonald, supra note 21, at 8.
194. Sander, supra note 61.
195. Id.
196. Monica Vendituoli, UConn Will Pay $1.3-Million to Settle 5 Women's Sexual-Assault
Lawsuit, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 1, 2014, at A4.
197. Rachel Axon, Florida State Agrees to Pay Winston Accuser $950,000 to Settle Suit, USA
TODAY (Jan. 25, 2016, 6:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2016/01/25/florida-
state-settles-title-ix-lawsuit-erica-kinsman-jameis-winston/79299304/.
198. Wilson, supra note 65.
199. Libby Sander, 3 Accused of Sexual Misconduct Say Colleges Acted Hastily and Assumed





203. Smith, supra note 63.
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Nearly fifty lawsuits by accused students are in process, an increase from
roughly twelve in 2013.204 In sum, young men are as unhappy with the
outcome of college investigations as their accusers, and often both sides,
find the process unfair.205
Attorneys representing both survivors and the accused report they
are seeing an uptick in cases. Brett Sokolow, president of the National
Center for Higher Education Risk Management, which also oversees
ATIXA, notes receiving nearly sixty calls from accused students and
their parents, of which he is now representing roughly a dozen. 20 Anoth-
er attorney, Andrew Miltenberg, reported receiving fifteen calls each
207month in 2014. Recent changes in Title IX compliance are designed to
reform formal complaint systems that are not seen as safe, accessible,
and credible, or that ignore "ugly behavior that is not overtly illegal."2 08
This includes bullying, hazing, or any activities that may be seen as "tra-
ditional high jinks," "everyone does it," or "no harm was intended."20 9
Title IX compliance efforts must reform systems that discourage
people from making complaints. Common complaint system problems
also include confidentiality violations, requiring written complaints,
lengthy time periods to resolve complaints, officials with little under-
standing of the law or inadequate training on proper procedures, percep-
tions that important people are treated differently, or that the system it-
210
self is overseen by the people seen as the source of the problem. Inher-
ently the culture of non-reporting and the tension between individual and
organizational interests result in a compliance regime that is severely
limited in its effectiveness. As evidenced in the next Part, in seeking to
navigate these tensions, Title IX Coordinators frequently depart from the
compliance archetype. Reasons for the departure include efforts to seek
substantive justice for both survivors and alleged perpetrators and con-
cerns that the formal system is too formalistic and rigid.
B. Title IX Coordinators Depart from Compliance to Address the Ineffec-
tiveness of the Compliance Regime
Departures from the archetype occur primarily to address the needs
of survivors or alleged perpetrators, out of frustration with the inefficien-
204. Id.
205. Wilson, supra note 65.
206. Robin Wilson, Presumed Guilty, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 1, 2014),
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Presumed-Guilty/148529.
207. Id.
208. Rowe, Wilcox & Gadlin, supra note 178, at 56.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 57.
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cies of excessive formalism, and to address the organization's interest in
resolving disputes and avoiding liability. 2 1 1
One Coordinator poignantly describes frustration with the formal
system:
[T]he part that makes [it] really difficult is that the ... conduct hear-
ing is very formal [and] the victim is expected to mount her own de-
fense. She must call her own witnesses. She must question her own
witnesses. She must answer questions from the panel.... It's very
problematic, and I will tell you .. . [the conduct panel gives the com-
plainant] X number of days to get their documentation in while [a
complainant may be] grieving over the loss of her virginity and feel-
ing frightened for her physical safety and all these things are going
on. The dad [is] trying to help get the paperwork together and gather
the names of the witnesses and get witness statements. There's all
these requirements. ... Here, we don't even make you fill out a form.
You come in, we take notes. . .. I struggled when you said positive
outcome because there's not a young woman that's been through this
process that has not said to me "the process was worse [than what
happened to me]." It is re-victimization. The one that went [to the
next step] said "I don't want money, I just don't want another girl to
have to go through this."
212
Further, some Title IX Coordinators depart from the archetype be-
cause they see the formal process as too confrontational and thus harmful
to survivors. For example,
You don't know how it's burdened my heart. I often see them right
after, the day after. They're traumatized. They cry.. . . They [are of-
ten] furious .. .. Furious. [She] said that everyone over there was in-
competent, unfeeling ... our process is so victim unfriendly.213
Coordinators often expressed strong dissatisfaction with the formal
process. For example, "knowing what our adjudication process is
like . . .when they first come [in], I just dread it. Because I know what's
coming. I just think 'oh my God, how can I do this to this person?"'
214
Another Coordinator concurred:
I think once you're into a process such as a Title IX process, it's so
formal at that particular point, and the requirements are so different
that it's hard to maintain that sense of safety and security of why you
came to university. . . . I really try to make it as non-intrusive as I can
when we're doing complaints with students. That's not what they re-
ally signed up for, so we try to get through them quicker than the
211. Brian Pappas, Dear Colleague: Title IX Coordinators and Inconsistent Compliance with
the Laws Governing Campus Sexual Misconduct, 52 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
212. Interviewee 4, T12B3:8-1l; 7:33-39; 3:39-43.
213. Interviewee 4, T12B48:13, 23, 19.
214. Interviewee 4, T12B8:17-18.
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employees, let's get in there, let's find out the facts and get out so
that they can finish their studies.215
Specifically, regarding confidentiality, the departure from formality
is evidenced by Title IX Coordinators' respect for Ombuds commitment
to confidentiality. By not insisting that all offices must provide the Coor-
dinator with information about complaints, Title IX Coordinators depart
from the archetypal model. A Coordinator notes, "Ombuds don't have
the legal [confidentiality] privilege, but they have that code and our cam-
pus completely respects that."216 Yet another Coordinator explained,
[W]e recognize [the Ombuds Office] as being a place where employ-
ees or students can come and get hings off their chests, share with
someone, and maybe get some good advice where they will know
that the information that they share doesn't necessarily have to be
acted upon. That's important for individuals who are afraid to go
through the process. The [formal] process can be very intimidating,
depending on the circumstance, so again I think that's a valuable out-
let for employees and students. Years ago when we established [the
Ombuds] Office there was a ground swelling of support from staff
and students to say "we need something like this on our campus," so
it was established. So I think it definitely serves a great purpose but I
think those individuals have to be very knowledgeable [about] the
campus in order to give people really good advice.217
Title IX Coordinators also depart from the compliance archetype
with. the understanding that gaining complainants' trust will lead com-
plainants to be more willing to participate in the formal process. Some of
these Coordinators depart from Coordinator archetype in ways that are
aimed at building complainants' trust. For example,
If the information comes to us and they've not shared the name of the
accused with the first responder, meaning if it happens on campus
and they share that information with one of our resident assis-
tants .. . but they don't give a name, and they don't want to, then of
course they haven't told them, they haven't told the police, they're
not going to tell us. Sometimes they might [if we establish a relation-
ship]. You want to see if you can build enough trust in the conversa-
tion or support in the conversation that the person will [see this as a
safe place to report].218
Typically, resident assistants are mandatory reporters, indicating
that the above Title IX Coordinator is departing from the compliance
archetype in favor of building trust and legitimacy. Over deferring to
individuals' control over confidentiality is one type of departure.
215. Interviewee 1, TIOA14:3-10.
216. Interviewee 4, T12B4:9-10.
217. Interviewee 3, TI 3A5:42-6:7.
218. Interviewee 12, T2B4:17-26.
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Often a Coordinator may truly want to provide the visitor with con-
trol. In the clearest example, a Title IX Coordinator described conversa-
tions with students but taking no notes:
I do not take notes .. . [and make] [n]o record of the conversation. So
in that way, it's kind of like the Ombuds experience. I give people an
opportunity to state their case. What is the problem, what do they
think the problem is, how do they want to resolve it? .. . [I do not
provide any initial statement before students start talking] I'm just
letting [the student] get it off [their] chest and see where we're going
with this. . . . Because a lot of times they just want to vent. They just
want somebody else to hear what's going on and tell them whether or
not they're crazy. If they are serious about it, I have a formal intake
form to fill where they can file a complaint. It's pretty simple and
straightforward. . . . Usually when it's sexual in nature ... there are
some key things that a person will come in and tell me that will lead
me to believe that something was not consensual and now we've got
to do something. I tell them, "I need to stop you. I need to review
what I've heard, and I need you to know that this is no longer a 'what
do I do conversation,' this is a 'what are we going to do' conversa-
tion." Because there's just too much information, there's too many
things going on making my skin crawl, and now we've got to address
it. I don't care if they tell me they want to investigate it or not, if I've
got evidence, I'm investigating, especially sexual harassment. There
are no ifs, ands, or buts about it. If they have evidence to prove that
something unseemly was going on and it wasn't consensual, I'm
checking it out.219
Other Coordinators also depart from the archetype by not docu-
menting visitors' statements:
We have a complaint form, but . .. I am loathe to require that they
complete it until we talk.... I'm also loathe to tape record because it
changes the tenor of a meeting when you put that thing between the
two of you, and [on that point] the general counsel and I [disa-
gree]. 220
Still other Title IX Coordinators provide complainants with control
over whether the Title IX Coordinator will investigate-a clear departure
from the archetypal model. For example, a Coordinator noted "the goal
of the meeting is to give [visitors] their options and to hear if they made
a decision about a complaint. What do they want to have happen?"221
Another Coordinator described the decision to go forward with a com-
plaint as a "collaborative decision" in which anything said by the visitor
219. Interviewee I1, TI 1A45:8-14, 20-24, 29-34; 13:1-10; 7:4-8.
220. Interviewee 4, T12A6:37-42.
221. Interviewee 9, T8Al2:28-29.
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222could be used for their detriment. Other Coordinators described telling
visitors their options:
[Does the visitor want to use the] Ombuds or [Title IX Coordinator],
or [do they] want to deal with it on their own, because that's always
an option, or do they just want to drop it? They always have options.
Once they tell me where they want to go with it, because some of
them are adamant about "no, I want to nail him to the wall, so you're
the person I want to talk to." I tell them "here's the form" because I
never want them to make a decision in the heat of the moment.
"Here's my ... complaint form, my intake form." . . . And I ask them
to write out or type up their complaint, which requires them to go
away, think about what they've said, what they want to do, and come
back. Sometimes I never see them again because once they put it in
writing and they see it they change their minds.223
While some Title IX Coordinators provide more confidentiality and
control to survivors than the compliance archetype requires, other Ti-
tle IX Coordinators do not adequately protect confidentiality. Many Ti-
tle IX Coordinators reveal more information to more officials than may
be absolutely necessary to ensure effective enforcement. For example, an
Ombuds critically described the university's Title IX Coordinator:
Well, they don't keep confidentiality. I mean, they always say "of
course we keep confidentiality except on a need to know basis," but
their idea of who needs to know is wide and broad, so you can be
fairly certain that if you go to [a formal office] that everybody will
know that you went and what you said. If you go you can [also] be
fairly certain that their bias will be for the university, no questions
asked.224
Another Coordinator described reporting to the president and other
administrators on "everything and anything that could be a potential em-
barrassment to the institution, that could be a headline tomorrow morn-
ing. I don't want them being blindsided by anything. It's what any good
subordinate does for [his or her] boss."225
Still other Title IX Coordinators depart from the archetype by mak-
ing pre-conversation statements that provide basic information but not
enough to educate visitors about their options.
[We try to explain this] before we've heard the complainant's entire
story, so it allows the complainant to kind of decide how much
they're going to share with us and how detailed we're going to get,
[and] that's where we can give them some control. ... If what you
222. Interviewee 9, T8Al3:1-6.
223. Interviewee 11, TIIA6:1-13.
224. Interviewee 6, 09A9:21-26.
225. Interviewee 10, T7A4:4-8.
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tell us on its face violates a policy, then we're going to be doing a full
investigation.226
Many Coordinators attempt to provide a "warning" to visitors about
the Coordinator's obligation to conduct an investigation, albeit ineffec-
tively. Thus, one observed,
I do an investigation based upon the information you give me. My
role is not to talk and give you options. Unless there is nothing in
your conversation to suggest that you're being subjected to discrimi-
nation, and it is just bad behavior that you don't like and it doesn't
rise to the level of protected activity, of course I won't do anything.
But, for students who come in and say, "I've been sexually harassed
in the last month, but I don't want you to say anything," I stop them
and say, "I can't. This isn't the place for you." 227
Another Coordinator noted using a hypothetical that hen also takes
control away from the survivor.
In our office we generally don't use a form.... [w]e just collect
basic information: name, if the person was a student, faculty, or staff,
the nature of their complaint, who the witnesses may have been, if
there were any witnesses, what the complaint is in reference to. Usu-
ally, we'll have a conversation even before we get started, before the
person starts talking. We'll talk to them a little bit about our office
and what we do and let them know our obligations to move forward
if we have enough information to indicate that something is potential-
ly a violation of our policy [and] we have an obligation to investi-
gate. So if a person feels that they don't want to engage in that we
say you can give us a hypothetical, but if we have names and infor-
mation we may have to move forward. We try to advise them on the
front end before they begin to share information and try to gain their
confidence in our process and explain how our process works.228
In sum, in sharp contrast to the Title IX Coordinators who strictly
adhere to the archetypal model by giving top priority to investigation and
enforcement, some Coordinators grant more-or less-confidentiality
than the archetype demands, seek to build trust but only to entice com-
plainants into divulging more information than they seem to be willing to
provide, or provide complainants with control over whether to investi-
gate that directly undermines the commitment to investigation and en-
forcement.
226. Interviewee 13, TIB19:35-10:2.
227. Interviewee 1, Ti0A9:42-10:2.
228. Interviewee 3, T13A8:31-45.
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C. Reconciling Compliance with Cooperation
Title IX law and policy recognizes the limits of a compliance re-
gime. The White House Task Force Report recommends that university
officials should give the survivors of sexual misconduct more control
over the process by ensuring a place to go for confidential advice and
support.229 The Report observes that survivors are especially concerned
about maintaining their confidentiality and are hesitant to come forward
with allegations.2 30 While many survivors want he school to respond
quickly, others are not so sure and want someone to talk to before they
lose control of what happens next. Mandating that all employees report
sexual misconduct leaves survivors with fewer places to turn, and the
Task Force recommends that "[s]chools should identify trained, confi-
dential survivor advocates who can provide emergency and ongoing sup-
,,231
port. It recommends that these confidential resources should include
on-campus counselors and advocates, survivor advocacy offices, wom-
en's and health centers, and licensed and pastoral counselors.23 2 Ombuds
offices are not included in the list of confidential resources.
In order to reconcile compliance with cooperation and address the
crisis of legitimacy facing Title IX Coordinators, universities must pro-
vide clear and understandable grievance policies and processes. The dif-
ficulty in achieving clarity is illustrated by fundamental disagreements
about issues of due process. There are concerns about what constitutes a
"hearing" and whether Title IX enforcement is being interpreted consist-
ently, as required, with federally guaranteed due process rights.233 There
are also questions of the equality of interim accommodations. Recent
OCR guidance indicates that interim measures to address a complaint-
e.g., to ensure that misconduct is stopped-should be taken immediately
and should "minimize the burden on the complainant."234 Proponents of
respondent rights argue this is harmful to the due process rights of the
accused as "alleged perpetrators [would thus face] expulsion from their
residences upon accusation."235 Survivors' advocates argue "innocent
until proven guilty" is beneficial to the accused, harmful to the rights of
the survivor, and an indication of the depth to which the criminal law
mindset still pervades institutional responses.236 Burden of proof ques-
tions also persist, with commenters and one federal court suggesting that
229. THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra
note 53, at 10-11.
230. Id. at 11.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 3.
233. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 13.
234. Id at 32-33.
235. Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. Ky. L. REV. 49,62 (2013).
236. Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Campus Violence: Understanding the Extraordinary Through the
Ordinary, 35 J.C. & U.L. 613, 686 (2009).
2016] 107
DENVER LAWREVIEW
the required preponderance of the evidence standard23 7 is inappropriate
and that clear and convincing proof is a necessary standard to ensure
adequate protection of the accused student's right to procedural due pro-
238cess.
Regardless of the correct legal standards applied, grievance proce-
dures today are difficult for anyone to follow and understand, especially
undergraduates experiencing sexual misconduct or facing misconduct
allegations. For example, the University of Kansas Sexual Harassment
and Sexual Violence Policy is a document of over 8,000 words239 that
links to a Student Non-Academic Conduct Procedures Policy of over
5,000 words.2 40 The Michigan State University Policy on Relationship
Violence and Sexual Misconduct241 is nearly 14,000 words and contains
242nine appendixes. By comparison, Pennsylvania State University's
website describes Title IX Procedures is under 2,000 words,243 but links
to the Code of Conduct and Student Conduct Procedures document of
nearly 10,000 words, nearly 2,000 of which are devoted to sexual mis-
conduct across multiple sections.244 Notably, Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity provides for both a hearing and investigative model, contributing to a
lack of clarity.245 Complicated grievance policies may provide for cer-
tainty and predictability, but may be of little use to victims and alleged
perpetrators when they are difficult to understand and follow.
Confidential resources like on-campus counselors and advocates,
survivor advocacy offices, women's and health centers, and licensed and
pastoral counselors must be able to help survivors and alleged perpetra-
tors understand the range of options available to them. Given the ineffec-
tiveness of the compliance regime, universities require an impartial, in-
dependent, and confidential resource that can help to surface complaints
while providing individuals with clear guidance on options. This re-
source exists in the form of university Ombuds who practice to the
standards of their professional archetype. The next Section describes
237. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 26.
238. Barclay Sutton Hendrix, Note, A Feather on One Side, a Brick on the Other: Tilting the
Scale Against Males Accused ofSexual Assault in Campus Disciplinary Proceedings, 47 GA. L. REV.
591, 614 (2013); Lavinia M. Weizel, Note, The Process That Is Due: Preponderance of the Evidence
as the Standard of Proof or University Adjudications of Student-on-Student Sexual Assault Com-
plaints, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1639 (2012).
239. Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence, U. KAN. POL'Y LtBR.,
https://policy.ku.edu/IOA/sexual-harassment-sexual-violence-procedures (last updated Aug. 31,
2016).
240. Student Non-Academic Conduct Procedures, U. KAN. POL'Y LIBR.,
https://policy.ku.edu/student-affairs/non-academic-student-conduct (follow "Nonacademic Miscon-
duct Procedures_8.22.2016.pdf" hyperlink) (last updated Aug. 22, 2016).
241. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MICH. ST. UNIV., supra note 3.
242. Id. Appendix H, describing the student conduct hearing procedures, is nearly three thou-
sand words. Id. app. H.
243. Title IX Procedures, supra note 92.
244. OFFICE OF STUDENT CONDUCT, PA. STATE UNIV., CODE OF CONDUCT & STUDENT
CONDUCT PROCEDURES (2016), http://studentaffairs.psu.edu/conduct/docs/OSCProcedures.docx.
245. Id. at 13-14.
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university Ombuds as a prerequisite for compliance with Title IX law
and policy.
III. OMBUDS: A REQUIREMENT FOR TITLE IX COMPLIANCE
As Title IX Coordinators are a key element of the formal mecha-
nism for ensuring compliance with Title IX, the archetypal Title IX Co-
ordinator model treats confidentiality very differently than the model
Ombuds. Instead of utilizing confidentiality to encourage reporting, Ti-
tle IX law and policy works to strengthen protections for complainants
from retaliation and to educate potential complainants about where con-
fidentiality can and cannot be maintained. This is in stark contrast to the
model Ombuds, whose confidentiality requirements provide their visitors
with control over the extent of the intervention. First, this Section de-
scribes the confidentiality obligations as detailed by the Office for Civil
Rights. Ombuds are then described as a mechanism to strengthen the
work of Title IX Compliance offices. Specifically, the Ombuds model
and the guidelines for confidentiality are discussed, followed by exam-
ples of Ombuds adhering to the archetype. Ombuds impartiality and in-
dependence guidelines are then analyzed as they relate to confidentiality.
As the compliance regime is not effectively encouraging reports of sexu-
al misconduct, informal alternatives that provide confidentiality can
augment and strengthen the formal reporting mechanisms.
The formal system's general lack of legitimacy and broader ineffec-
tiveness in encouraging reports is addressed in recent OCR guidance.
The 2014 OCR Q&A document provides guidance on how to balance the
conflicting goal of providing self-determination yet encouraging report-
ing.246 First, OCR directs universities to "make clear to all of its employ-
ees and students which staff members are responsible employees so that
students can make informed decisions about whether to disclose infor-
mation to those employees."247 Second, employees are required to pro-
vide an initial warning, and "[blefore a student reveals information that
he or she may wish to keep confidential, [the employee] should make
every effort to ensure that the student understands."248 Information that
should be shared includes the employee's reporting obligations (includ-
ing the names of the survivor and perpetrator and relevant facts regarding
the incident), where the employee must report, and the individual's right
to request confidentiality.249 The responsible employee must specifically
inform the student of his ability "to share the information confidentially
with counseling, advocacy, health, mental health, or sexual-assault-
related services (e.g., sexual assault resource centers, campus health cen-
246. See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
247. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 15.




ters, pastoral counselors, and campus mental health centers)."250 In terms
of the different levels of confidentiality that may be provided, profes-
sional and pastoral counselors have the ability to provide completely
confidential support services to victims of sexual violence.251 Non-
professional counselors are allowed to maintain the confidentiality of
personally identifiable information about incidents of sexual violence,
but must make reports.252 Non-professional counselors are defined as
individuals who "work or volunteer in on-campus sexual assault centers,
victim advocacy offices, women's centers, or health centers."253 Non-
professional counselors must report "aggregate data" of general infor-
mation (nature, date, time, and general location of the incident) and
"should take care to avoid reporting information that would personally
identify a student."2 54 Non-professional counselors are advised to "con-
sult with students regarding what information needs to be withheld to
protect their identity."255 Ombuds are presumably non-professional coun-
selors and must provide general information about any incident of which
256they become aware.
There are three reasons the OCR guidance is ineffective at best.
First, efforts to educate large campuses about reporting requirements
tend to include online trainings that serve to reduce the universities' pro-
spective liability but do not indicate increased knowledge of the require-
ments. Checking the box of completing training does not mean the train-
ing is effective. Second, individuals reporting sexual misconduct do not
always signal the responsible employee of what they are about to say. To
require an initial warning is neither realistic nor always possible. Third,
complicated grievance policies are a challenge for individuals serving in
a counseling or professional role.257 Professional counselors may not
understand or desire to provide survivors and alleged perpetrators with
unbiased or complete information about their options. Given the chal-
lenge of balancing individual self-determination with organizational in-
terests in safety and avoiding liability, how can institutions encourage
survivors to come forward? Mary Rowe, Linda Wilcox, and Howard
Gadlin encourage the use of Ombuds offices as "[t]here is no single poli-
cy that will make an organization seem trustworthy and no single proce-
250. Id.





256. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No 113-4, 127 Stat. 54
(codified as amended in scattered sections of42 U.S.C.) (providing no change to Ombuds status as a
mandatory reporter); Rick Koepke, Exec. Dir., Int'l Ombudsman Ass'n, Comment Letter on FR
Doc# 2014-14384 (July 14, 2014),
https://www.ombudsassociation.org/IOAMain/media/SiteFiles/IOA-Public-Comment-for-FR-Doc-
2014-14384.pdf (requesting that colleges and universities be permitted to designate Ombuds as a
"confidential resource" rather than as a "responsible employee").
257. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
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dure or practice that will guarantee that people will overcome all the bar-
riers to coming forward." 258
A. What is an Ombuds?
Charles Howard, author of The Organizational Ombudsman, de-
scribes the origins of the Ombuds' function as a response to the ineffec-
tiveness of formal complaint systems.2 59 As legal, compliance, and hu-
man resources personnel are unable to provide confidentiality to employ-
ees seeking to report misconduct or other conflicts,260 legislators and
organizations sought other means of complying with the law and resolv-
ing interorganizational conflict. The Ombudsman role is the least under-
stood option in the alternative dispute resolution field.261 There is signifi-
cant confusion about what an Ombuds is and significant dispute on the
issue among Ombuds themselves.262 There is basic confusion resulting
from a lack of a common "definition of the term Ombudsman, how it is
interpreted, and who uses it." 263 There is also confusion as to whether the
term "Ombudsman" is gender-specific.264
There are many different types of Ombuds. "Classical Ombuds" are
those originating from the Swedish parliament in the early 1800s and
which have statutory independence, the authority to investigate com-
265plaints, and the authority to issue reports or recommendations. By con-
trast, Organizational Ombuds are established not by statute but by their
organization's institutional governance structure and do not typically
have a formal investigative function.266 While the first university and
corporate Ombuds were "truly amateurs" selected on the basis of their
knowledge of the institution and their personal reputations for integrity,
fairness, and sympathy, over time the Ombuds' role became institutional-
ized and standards of practice developed.26 7
Many organizations founded Ombuds programs as a means of
providing alternatives to formal grievance systems and for attending to
the underlying interests that give rise to disputes, which often are not
well addressed by formal rules and organizational guidelines.268 Ombuds
are now common mechanisms in both the private and public sector. One
survey found that 20 federal agencies and over 1,000 U.S. corporations
258. Rowe, Wilcox & Gadlin, supra note 178, at 63.
259. CHARLES L. HOWARD, THE ORGANIZATIONAL OMBUDSMAN: ORIGINS, ROLES, AND
OPERATIONS-A LEGAL GUIDE 144 (2010).
260. Id.
261. Howard Gadlin, The Ombudsman: What's in a Name?, 16 NEGOT. J. 37, 37 (2000).
262. Id.
263. Samantha Levine-Finley & John S. Carter, Then and Now: Interviews with Expert US.
Organizational Ombudsmen, 28 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 111, 127 (2010).
264. This Article uses the term "Ombuds" except in quotations that use another term.
265. Gadlin, supra note 261, at 38.
266. Id. at 39.
267. Id. at 40.
268. Id. at 43.
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use Ombuds.26 9 Educational Ombuds first appeared in the 1960s with the
establishment of offices at Michigan State University and Eastern Mon-
tana College to hear student and faculty complaints during a time of
widespread student unrest.270 Today, there are at least 200 college and
university Ombuds in the United States who handle problems affecting
students, faculty, and staff.
271
Functionally, a university or college Ombuds is a confidential re-
source for anyone who has a complaint or concern about a university
employee or policy. Ombuds are intended to help defuse situations be-
fore they become larger problems by helping individuals think through
options, clarify goals, and improve communication. Ombuds do not tell
people what to do. Instead, they are intended to listen without judgment.
Most importantly, Ombuds provide confidentiality to individuals and do
not put the institution on "notice" for purposes of creating a legal respon-
sibility to act. Ombuds do not duplicate any services, in the sense that
they have no authority to formally resolve a dispute, impose a sanction,
or order a remedy. Instead, they merely provide a place for people to turn
if they don't know where to go.
B. Confidentiality Encourages Reporting
As confidentiality encourages the filing of complaints, Ombuds are
an ideal mechanism for encouraging reporting of sexual misconduct. 272
The most common reasons individuals decide not to make a complaint or
take other steps to stop behavior they find unacceptable includes "fear of
loss of relationships, and loss of privacy, fear of unspecified 'bad conse-
quences' or retaliation, and insufficient evidence."273 A 2002 Time/CNN
Survey/Harris Interactive poll revealed that 87% of the public perceived
274that whistleblowers face retaliation some or most of the time. In a
1999 survey of whistleblowers, 69% stated that they lost their jobs or
were forced to retire as a result of coming forward, and another 69%
reported that they were criticized or avoided by their co-workers.275 Fear
of retaliation is a common reason to avoid reporting, but forbidding retal-
iation is not very effective because "few people understand or trust such
269. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Ombudsman Offices in the Federal Government-An Emerging
Trend?, AM. B. Ass'N ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 1997, at 6.
270. Scott C. Van Soye, Illusory Ethics: Legal Barriers to an Ombudsman's Compliance with
Accepted Ethical Standards, 8 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 117, 123 (2007).
271. DOUGLAS H. YARN, GEORGIA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2:14 (2016).
272. Koepke, supra note 256 ("Organizational Ombudsman, without breaching the confidence
of any individual inquirer, can often provide options for surfacing systemic issues or concerns that
can greatly benefit their institutions.").
273. Rowe, Wilcox & Gadlin, supra note 178, at 52.
274. THE CONFERENCE BD. COMM'N ON PUB. TR. & PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 23 (2003), https://www.conference-board.org/pdf free/SR-03-04.pdf.
275. Joyce Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistle-Blower Disclosures and Management
Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information About Organization Corruption, 26 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 107, 120 (1999).
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a policy," and retaliation is hard to prove and prevent where "delayed,
indirect, diffuse, outside the workplace, or covert."27 6
Anonymous hotlines or reporting mechanisms are sometimes pro-
posed as a way of encouraging the making of complaints, but some re-
search suggests that these mechanisms are not as effective for this pur-
pose as sometimes believed.277 Despite a 2007 survey indicating that half
of employees had personally observed violations of "company ethics
standards, policy, or the law," 27 8 a 2007 survey of over 650 companies
revealed reporting rates were less than 1%.279
A possible explanation for why anonymous reporting mechanisms
do not encourage reporting is because survivors want someone they can
talk to confidentially before deciding whether to make an official report.
In a 2007 study, 39% of college students indicated that students had con-
flicts they wanted to pursue but did not, most commonly due to fear of
retribution (37%), expectation of a negative outcome (38%), and lack of
knowledge of how to pursue the conflict (33%).280 Several dozen reasons
explain why people do not act directly and effectively when they see
unacceptable behavior and do not use conflict management systems in
timely and appropriate ways.281 Reasons include fear of loss of relation-
ships, fear of retaliation or other bad consequences, fear that they will not
appear credible to management, and inaccessibility or lack of credibility
of those who might make a difference.282 Additional factors include (1) a
belief that people lack "enough evidence" to pursue an issue, (2) lack of
knowledge about relevant resources or policies, (3) distrust of senior
management, (4) shame, and (5) a belief that no one will listen.283 Hesi-
tance with anonymous, impersonal reporting is echoed in the data on
bystander interventions, noting over half of respondents in a national
survey of adults suspected a friend, family member, or co-worker was a
survivor of domestic violence, but 65% wanted more information about
what to do.284 Further, 58% of college students surveyed did not know
285
how to help a survivor.
276. Rowe, Wilcox & Gadlin, supra note 178, at 54.
277. HOWARD, supra note 259, at 161 (summarizing the research indicating limitations on
hotline effectiveness).
278. Id. at 167 (internal quotation marks omitted).
279. SEC. EXEC. COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPLIANCE HOTLINE
BENCHMARKING REPORT 11 (2007).
280. Tyler R. Harrison, My Professor Is So Unfair: Student Attitudes and Experiences of Con-
flict with Faculty, 24 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 349,356-57 (2007).
281. Mary Rowe, An Organizational Ombuds Office in a System for Dealing with Conflict and
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Ombuds are the ideal mechanism for restoring individuals' beliefs
in the legitimacy of the organization. The organizational context can be a
barrier to reporting when the complaint system is not seen as safe, acces-
sible, and credible.286 Further, there could be the perception that im-
portant people get treated differently or the system's procedures are not
accessible, take a long period of time, do not respect privacy, or are over-
seen by the people seen as the source of the problem.287
In contrast to anonymous hotlines, in-person mechanisms that
promise confidentiality, like Ombuds, have been shown to increase trust
in the organization and possibly encourage the making of complaints.2 88
A study of campus Ombuds, by Tyler Harrison and Marya Doerfel,
found that over 50% of students bringing an issue to an Ombuds received
favorable or somewhat favorable outcomes.289 Of students who did not
receive a favorable outcome, a majority still thought the process was fair
and contributed to feeling trust and commitment toward the organiza-
290tion.
Ombuds are capable of providing survivors with confidentiality and
self-determination, and research indicates student satisfaction rates of
60%291 to 90% after using an Ombuds on a range of student-faculty dis-
292putes from grading policies to harassment. Most importantly, prior
research indicates female students may especially benefit from speaking
with an Ombuds. A survey of students who used an Ombuds found fe-
male students were significantly more likely to pursue a future grievance
of harassment.293 Women were also significantly more concerned than
men about confidentiality, specifically the effect of pursuing a grievance
on their department standing, potential retribution, and they were more
likely than men to expect negative outcomes.294
Mandatory reporting policies may inhibit reporting because individ-
uals do not want to get other people fired or in trouble and do not trust
the employer to do a fair investigation.295 Rowe, Wilcox, and Gadlin
state it best, "If the dilemmas are managed badly by providing too few
286. Rowe, Wilcox & Gadlin, supra note 178, at 56.
287. Id. at 57.
288. Michael L. Sulkowski, An Investigation of Students' Willingness to Report Threats of
Violence in Campus Communities, I PSYCHOL. VIOLENCE 53,61 (2011).
289. Tyler R. Harrison & Marya L. Doerfel, Competitive and Cooperative Conflict Communi-
cation Climates: The Influence ofOmbuds Processes on Trust and Commitment o the Organization,
17 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 129,145 (2006).
290. Id.
291. Mary P. Rowe, Case 3. Academic Ombudsman Cost Estimates, 15 J. HEALTH & HUM.
RESOURCES ADMIN. 299, 300 (1993).
292. Tyler R. Harrison, What Is Success in Ombuds Processes? Evaluation of a University
Ombudsman, 21 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 313,315 (2004).
293. Id. at 358.
294. Id. at 359.
295. Rowe, Wilcox & Gadlin, supra note 178, at 58.
114 [Vol. 94:1
OUT FROM THE SHADOWS
options (and zero tolerance may offer no options), fewer people will
come forward."296 Miller echoes this view:
[T]he provision of a safe place in which options for action and re-
sponse can safely be heard, away from the clamor of police sirens
and media-fuelled public approbation, can help to protect the indi-
vidual and public interest by ensuring that matters have a greater
likelihood of swift resolution. ... [An Ombuds'] very informality,
neutrality and confidentiality enable the exercise of justice by ensur-
ing that alleged victims and perpetrators can safely and more fully
consider their options for exercising their rights.297
Providing confidentiality to visitors is necessary in order to allow
students and employees to feel comfortable asking for help or making a
complaint. Noted Ombuds Brian Bloch, David Miller, and Mary Rowe
believe that promising confidentiality helps people come forward.
Our experience is that only a relatively small proportion of the popu-
lation is comfortable with formal actions (although importantly, some
in this group are satisfied only by formal investigations and formal
action). But most people, most of the time, are quite reluctant to act
on the spot, or report unacceptable behavior, if they believe this will
result in formal action. This is one of the reasons why options are
needed in a complaint system.298
Ombuds are ideal for individuals who do not know where to go,
need help understanding the maze of options, want complete confidenti-
ality, and want to retain their control over the next steps. Instead of re-
quiring Title IX Coordinators to be flexible in their formal compliance
function, Ombuds can be utilized to realize the best of both formal and
informal dispute mechanisms. The next Part describes the model Om-
buds' confidentiality requirements.
C. Ombuds' Confidentiality Requirements
The model Ombuds is not an office of notice, meaning that any
communications made to the Ombuds would constitute making the uni-
versity officially aware of the complaint and thus responsible for reme-
dying the misconduct. The principles of the Ombuds model require that
these offices maintain the confidentiality of visitors' identities and any
information that could lead to their identification.2 99 Ombuds give priori-
ty to confidentiality over compliance. They promise absolute confidenti-
ality and do not make reports about specific individuals. Ombuds only
296. Id
297. Miller, supra note 82, at 6-7.
298. Brian Bloch, David Miller & Mary Rowe, Systems for Dealing with Conflict and Learning
from Conflict-Options for Complaint-Handling: An Illustrative Case, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
239, 240 (2009) (alteration in original).
299. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.1.
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make reports about trends when the complete anonymity of the visitor
can be ensured.300
Confidentiality is an International Ombudsman Association (IOA)
Standard of Practice, with Standard 3.1 requiring Ombuds hold commu-
nications in strict confidence by not revealing, or being required to reveal
(without express permission), the identity or information that could lead
to identification of any visitors contacting the office.301 Further, the Om-
buds only takes action with the individual's express permission. This is
done at the discretion of the Ombuds and only when it can be done safe-
guarding the individual's identity. Describing confidentiality as a privi-
lege, the standard provides an exception where there appears to be immi-
nent risk of serious harm, which is an assessment that is to be made by
the Ombuds.302 Standard 3.2 specifically states that communication be-
tween the Ombuds and others is privileged, with the privilege held by
(and thus only waivable by) the Ombuds.303 Confidentiality should be
discussed with visitors prior to them sharing their concerns.304 The IOA
Best Practices states that the Ombuds may negotiate with the organiza-
tion to be exempt from mandatory reporting requirements, and imminent
risk of serious harm should be construed as narrowly as possible.30 5
IOA Standard 3.3 extends the principle of confidentiality to prohibit
Ombuds from testifying in any formal process within or outside the or-
ganization.306 This prohibition operates whether the individual provides
permission or requests the Ombuds come forward.307 Other IOA Stand-
ards regarding confidentiality include 3.5, requiring the Ombuds to keep
no records containing identifying information on behalf of the organiza-
tion,308 and 3.6, requiring the Ombuds to maintain information such as
notes, phone messages, calendars, in a secure location, protected from
inspection, with a standard, consistent practice for destroying infor-
mation.3 09 IOA Standard 3.8 dictates that the communications made to
Ombuds are not considered notice to the organization, Ombuds are not
agents of the organization, Ombuds should not be designated as agents,
and Ombuds will not accept notice to the institution.310
300. Id. § 3.7.
301. Id. § 3.1.
302. Id.
303. Id. § 3.2.
304. IOA BEST PRACTICES: A SUPPLEMENT TO IOA'S STANDARDS OF PRACTICE § 3.2 cmt. at 6
(INT'L OMBUDSMAN ASS'N, Version 3, Supp. 2009),
http://www.ombudsassociation.org/IOA_Main/media/SiteFiles/IOA Best-PracticesVersion3_1013
090.pdf.
305. Id. § 3.1 cmt. at 6.
306. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.3.
307. Id
308. Id. § 3.5.
309. Id. § 3.6.
310. Id. § 3.8.
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The IOA Best Practices specifies that even in situations in which the
visitor provides permission to the Ombuds to discuss a concern, the
model Ombuds should only discuss the issue in general terms and should
311not specify names, dates, or events. If the Ombuds receives permission
to share, notice occurs via the conversation between the Ombuds and the
organizational representative, not when the visitor communicates with
the Ombuds.3 12 As a result, there are "no circumstances [in which] the
original communication to the Ombudsman [becomes] part of the notice
6,13communication.
Further, the IOA Best Practices recommends that Ombuds publicize
their promises of confidentiality, be situated in a location designed to
protect visitors' privacy, and that permission to reveal information
should not be provided once the issue is being handled in a formal pro-
cess.314 Often, visitors will grant permission for an Ombuds to reveal
their identity or other information as they work to help them resolve the
issue. Once a visitor uses a formal process, an Ombuds should not agree
to release any information learned while working with that visitor.315
Despite the specific confidentiality restrictions of the role, Ombuds may
identify trends and issues about policies and procedures without breach-
ing confidentiality or anonymity.316
D. Ombuds as a Reporting Safety Net
Despite the stringent confidentiality requirements, Ombuds are able
to make reports about trends, policy issues, and any report as long as an
individual's anonymity is safeguarded. Two IOA provisions address re-
porting. First, Standard 3.4 requires that the Ombuds safeguard individu-
als' identities when providing systematic, upward feedback.3 17 Second,
Standard 3.7 requires the Ombuds to prepare reports and data in a way
that protects confidentiality.318 Under these constraints, an Ombuds may
act as a safety net ensuring that complaints are addressed, even in the
aggregate. The IOA Best Practices states that if issues cannot be raised in
confidence, individuals may be unwilling to raise them, thereby "depriv-
ing the organization of an opportunity to address issues and rectify mis-
conduct that has not yet surfaced through other channels."319 Organiza-
tions need confidential and anonymous channels of communication to
resolve workplace conflict and help people report misconduct.
311. IOA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 304, § 3.8 cmt. at 8.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. § 3.1 cmt. at 6.
315. Id. § 3.2 cmt. at 6.
316. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE,supra note 7, § 4.6.
317. Id. § 3.4.
318. Id. § 3.7.
319. Id. § 3.2 cmt. at 7.
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Ombuds also assist with larger organizational issues because "[t]he
freedom from management responsibility, combined with the everyday
process of speaking with people from any and all levels or locations of
the organization, give the ombuds a unique perspective on how the or-
ganization is performing and what problems it and its people face."320
Armed with this information, an Ombuds can provide recommendations
to organizational leaders on how to address broad institutional problems.
This is done anonymously in order to protect confidentiality. Through
feedback, improvements can be instituted, but these are neither suggested
nor administered by the Ombuds. By presenting the data that help to
identify trends, Ombuds can persuade managers to buy into system
change.321 As a result, Ombuds have many roles including "an institu-
tional response to curb wrongdoing or unethical behavior, a facilitator of
appropriate conduct by both individuals and the organization itself, and
an agent for promoting systemic change where necessary."322
Through these organizational activities, Ombuds serve an important
function of identifying problems missed by other processes due to the
ability to provide confidentiality and to bring issues identified as trends
to the forefront. The Ombuds mechanism may be an effective alternative,
as research indicates that individuals are often hesitant to file formal
complaints.323 Ombuds issue annual or biannual reports, and the 2009-
2011 report from the University of Kansas Ombuds echoes the need for
informal options.324 The report notes, "[n]o one solution, department, or
university unit can respond effectively to all situations. It is important
that the University of Kansas provides both formal and informal options
for campus members to address their concerns."325 The report describes
the results of a user survey of 102 of the 786 individuals meeting with
the Ombuds during the 2009 to 2011 reporting period.326 Individuals
accessing the Ombuds Office included faculty, students, and staff with
issues ranging from grade disputes to promotion issues and tenure con-
flicts.3 27 When asked what they would have done without the Ombuds
Office, a sample of the survey respondents indicated they would have
done the following: resigned, hired an attorney, left the university, esca-
lated the problem at additional time and cost, and nothing as they had
320. HOWARD, supra note 259, at 80.
321. Marsha L. Wagner, The Organizational Ombudsman as Change Agent, 16 NEGOT. J. 99,
108 (2000).
322. HOWARD, supra note 259, at 80-81.
323. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
324. KELLIE HARMON, MARIA ORIVE & STEPHEN GRABOW, UNIV. OMBUDS OFFICE, UNIV. OF
KAN., UNIVERSITY OMBUDS OFFICE BIENNIAL REPORT 2009-2011 (2011),
https://ombuds.ku.edu/sites/ombuds.ku.edulfiles/docs/2009-2011`%20biennial%20report.pdf.
325. Id. at 15.
326. Id. at 6-9, 15.
327. See id at 10.
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nowhere else to go.328 In the 2011-2013 report, whistleblowing and fear
of retaliation are described as an issue of ongoing concern.329
For purposes of a direct comparison of reporting rates for one cam-
pus, the Title IX Coordinator at the University of Michigan released an
inaugural annual report indicating that 129 instances of sexual miscon-
duct were reported between 2013 and 2014.330 Of the 129 reports, fifty-
eight, or 45%, were deemed to not fall under the purview of the sexual
misconduct policy.331 By comparison, the report of the Ombuds at the
University of Michigan for the same timeframe (2012-2013) indicates
the Ombuds met with 217 visitors, 86% of whom were students.3 2 Of
ninety-eight non-academic concerns brought to the Ombuds attention,
twenty-five concerned harassment and discrimination.333
Noted Ombuds Mary Rowe observed that "there are options other
than (a) keeping silent or (b) breaching confidentiality."3 34 These options
include discussing the facts, laws, and rules and, in doing so, encourag-
ing the visitor to decide to act responsibly to prevent future harm to oth-
ers. 335 Further, many visitors may be willing to come forward after time
has passed and circumstances have changed.336 Other visitors may be
willing to provide an anonymous note or give the Ombuds permission to
act in place of the visitor as long as the visitor's anonymity can be main-
tained.337 With the visitor's information, the Ombuds may be able to in-
stigate a "generic approach," like a routine safety audit and follow-up
training and catch the problem.338 Another option includes helping the
visitor prepare for the conversations and aiding them in learning the
skills necessary for acting effectively.339 Further, understanding whistle-
blower protection laws and policies against retaliation and finding an
"accompanying person" who shares their concerns may make the visitors
more likely to come forward.340
In addition to identifying problems and restoring individuals' views
that the institution cares about their concerns, much of the basis for the
use of Ombuds offices is related to confidentiality and avoiding legal
328. Id. at 15.
329. Id. at 7.
330. OFFICE FOR INSTITUTIONAL EQUAL., UNIV. OF MICH., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
STUDENT SEXUAL MISCONDUCT ANNUAL REPORT JULY 2013-JUNE 2014, at 2 (rev. ed. 2015),
https://hr.umich.edu/sites/default/files/student-sexual-misconduct-annual-report-2014.pdf.
331. Id. at 3.
332. TOM LEHKER, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, UNIV. OF MICH., ANNUAL REPORT 2012-
2013, at 2-3 (2013), https://studentlife.umich.edulfiles/ombuds/OmbudsReport20l3.pdf.
333. Id. at 5.
334. Mary Rowe, What Happens to Confidentiality If the Visitor Refuses to Report Unaccepta-
ble Behavior?, J. INT'L OMBUDSMAN ASS'N, 2011, at 40, 40.
335. Id. at 41.
336. Id. at 42.
337. Id.





liability. Ombuds are able to provide an "early warning" to "'con-
sult ... front-line staff or ... direct reports about morale or behavior or
procedures in a certain area" as long as they protect the anonymity of the
individuals involved.3 4 1 Remedial steps such as focused training, depart-
ment level surveys to determine specific issues, and other such mecha-
nisms can be used to address misconduct.342 Ombuds can provide these
services if confidentiality can be maintained and, thus, can ameliorate the
effects of conflict that often linger within the organization. A survey of
government workers indicated the damages caused by sexual harassment
are not limited to the initial event but instead can hurt the target, har-
asser, and organization members for an extended period.343 In sum, Om-
buds provide confidentiality to visitors but may report upwards in ways
that protect the institution from liability.
E. Ombuds Complying with the Archetype
Archetypal Ombuds are offices of informal deliberation and confi-
dentiality that use the principle of confidentiality to provide self-
determination to visitors as they consider whether or how to invoke more
formal organizational processes that typically promise much less-or
no-confidentiality. Many particular Ombuds offices emphasize the
principle of confidentiality in their documents or statements of practice.
For example, the University Senate Rules and Regulations at the Univer-
sity of Kansas specifically provide confidentiality as a power granted to
the Ombuds Office: "All proceedings in individual cases shall be held
confidential by the Ombudsman unless otherwise authorized by the com-
plainant."344 Notably, this contravenes IOA Standard 3.2, which specifi-
cally states that communication between the Ombuds, while serving in
that capacity, and others is privileged with the privilege held by the Om-
buds and the Ombuds office and not any other person.345 The University
of Kansas Ombuds Office provides that it has no power to receive notice
for the University and "all communications with an Ombuds are made
with the understanding that communication is confidential, off-the-
record, and that no one from the Omsbud Office will be called to testify
as a witness in any formal or legal proceeding to reveal confidential
communications, unless compelled by judicial subpoena or court or-
der."3 46 Michigan State University's Ombuds website echoes this view
and notes, "[i]nformation concerning any visit will not be disclosed
341. Wagner, supra note 321, at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted).
342. See id
343. Jeong-Yeon Lee, Sharon Gibson Heilmann & Janet P. Near, Blowing the Whistle on
Sexual Harassment: Test ofa Model ofPredictors and Outcomes, 57 HUM. REL. 297, 318 (2004).
344. University Senate Rules and Regulations (USRR) § 6.2.2.1, U. KAN. POL'Y LIBR.,
http://policy.ku.edu/govemance/USRR#art6sect2 (last updated Oct. 25, 2016).
345. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.2.
346. Authority and Limits of the Ombuds Office, U. KAN. OMBUDS OFF.,
https://ombuds.ku.edu/authority#receiving (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
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without the visitor's permission, absent compelling reasons (e.g., a court
order or potential risk to safety)."347
More generally, Ombuds who follow the archetype are not offices
of "notice" or compliance and maintain visitors' confidentiality and the
confidentiality of information that may lead to identifying a visitor. Ad-
herence to these principles includes maintaining confidentiality in diffi-
cult environments in which others are violating confidentiality, maintain-
ing the confidentiality of e-mail and phone communications, and report-
ing responsibly according to the archetypal model. Ombuds practicing to
the archetype also provide their visitors with control over whether and
how to report allegations of sexual misconduct.
Ombuds who adhere to the archetype face a series of dilemmas in
maintaining the confidentiality standard. Ombuds must subordinate other
values in order to maintain their commitment to confidentiality, and Om-
buds are very aware of the required tradeoff. For example, Ombuds who
adhere to the confidentiality standard are unable to report a sexual mis-
conduct violation even when it is egregious and done by a repeat violator
who is a professor and is preying on vulnerable students. One Ombuds
described maintaining confidentiality, even at the expense of the Om-
bud's preference for reporting:
I really do, again, think that it is a critical part of the service that I of-
fer that it is confidential and would really protect that value, even at
the risk of some others. If someone were the victim of a sexual as-
sault and came here, I assume they came here because I was obligat-
ed to keep that confidential. If they wanted [someone to be] more ac-
tive in terms of a response, [the visitor] would have gone to the po-
lice or they would have gone to the Title IX Coordinator, neither of
whom are obligated to keep that confidential and both of whom are
obligated to be more active in investigating that claim. . . . I really
would encourage . .. and work with [the visitor] in terms of what it is
they're so afraid about to actually [report] . . . . [I]f they're a victim
of sexual assault I would say go to the police first. I'd be happy to
support them in doing that. I would even go with them if they needed
me to. I'd walk them over, I'd call for them, something. Same with
the Title IX Coordinator if that's the way they wanted to go. I would
really encourage them as strongly as I could. [But at] the end of the
day, if they came here because of the protection of confidentiality, I
would honor that.348
Ombuds who adhere to the achetype must do so at the expense of
other values. For example, an Ombuds first described the situation,
347. About the Office of the University Ombudsperson, MICH. ST. U.,
https://www.msu.edu/unit/ombud/Aboutlindex.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
348. Interviewee 14, 04A10:1-5, 7:27-8:2.
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[O]n any ... research university campus . .. there are a number of
faculty who take advantage of their positions to ... develop amorous
relationships with their students, particularly their graduate students.
[One in particular had] a habit of inviting students to co-author
[something, which] ... is going to look really great on their resume
when they go out to look for a job. [This offer always came with an]
invit[ation] to engage in sexual acts . .. [that created] the perception
on the part of the graduate student, "if I say no, I will lose this pro-
fessional opportunity." I have had any number of [this faculty mem-
ber's] students come to me [over the years].349
Next the Ombuds described their own preferences.
I would have loved . . . to [have any of them be] the first one to step
forward. I would have loved to say if [the visitor] says "oh, no, I
don't want to go through all that, I'll just find another job" . . . "you
realize that by doing that you are sealing the fate of somebody else
that's going to be in here . . . the next person he's going to proposi-
tion, you realize that, right?" . . . I'd like to be able to say that, but I
can't in my role.350
Then the Ombuds explained when it is possible to raise the issue.
I have been to both the chair of [the] department and the dean and I
have told them, not during the time that anyone that I'm aware of is
actively being solicited, but I'll wait for the last person to see me to
leave, and then I'll go [talk to the department chair and the dean].3 51
What the Ombuds communicated to the chair or dean is next de-
scribed:
Look, over the last [several] years I've had [a number of] different
people come to me and tell me this general kind of story about [this
faculty member's] behavior . . .. Now I don't do investigations, I
don't apply lie detector tests, but [numerous people] telling me an
almost identical pattern of behavior . . .. I am concerned and I hope
that you are too, Ms. Chair or Mr. Dean, that sooner or later one of
these people is going to take one of the formal options I'm [telling]
them [about] and [that will result in] an investigation, embarrass-
ment, and hassle that could be avoided if this ... behavior were to be
altered. So whether there's any truth to these allegations or not, and
I'm not saying there is, I'm just saying that even if they're all made
up, my job is to tell them that one of their options is to go to the
[formal] office and file a charge and ultimately to the [govern-
ment] ... and [that will result in] federal investigators poking
349. Interviewee 8, 010B5:41-6:17.
350. Interviewee 8, Ol0OB11:19-27.
351. Interviewee 8, OlOB 1l:44-48.
122 [Vol. 94:1
OUT FROM THE SHADOWS
around . . .and I assume that you would prefer to avoid that. So I just
thought you'd want to know.352
Finally, the Ombuds noted how she maintained confidentiality and
also impartiality in the face of very difficult circumstances.
The hardest part of this job is knowing that in the next year or two
there will be another one of [the faculty member's] victims in my of-
fice, and there's an innocent person out there who may not be in the
program yet who's going to be victimized . .. if somebody doesn't
stand up and stop it. The only people that have .. . [the] standing to
do that is a victim . . . . I will tell people . . ."if you choose to
leave . . . you'll be out from under this person's control, please con-
sider writing down your experiences and sending them to the dean or
appropriate individual so that some kind of record exists of these be-
haviors." But frankly, that almost never happens .... They want to
start a new chapter in their life and put this behind them. . . . But
yeah, my preference is that these people stand up to these victimizers
and call them out for what they are and put them and the people re-
sponsible for their behavior on notice so that we can reduce the
chances of future innocent victims. Do I ever make a consultee aware
that that's my preference? Absolutely not. That would not be being
neutral on my part.353
Ombuds who want to stop egregious sexual misconduct may only
report under an exception for danger of imminent harm. One Ombuds
noted, "I would not be comfortable with [reporting while keeping the
visitor's identity anonymous], unless there [is] imminent risk of harm to
somebody... ."35 Sexual misconduct in particular presents a significant
challenge to Ombuds' confidentiality and determining when there is im-
minent risk of harm. Again following the archetypal model, an Ombuds
noted that risk of serious or imminent harm must be understood narrow-
ly:
[It] can be harm to oneself or someone else [but] typically what we
are more concerned about is someone hurting them-
selves.... [T]hey'll mention they've thought about suicide and those
sorts of things and you have to quickly . .. coordinate some support
for them. . . . I have [also] had someone make a terrorist threat in my
office before, so that happens too. 355
When Ombuds maintain confidentiality, they often also must sacri-
fice the goal of stopping misconduct. One Ombuds described educating
his visitor about his options but secretly wanting the person to report the
misconduct.
352. Interviewee 8, Ol0B 11:47-12:13.
353. Interviewee 8, 010B8:13-34.
354. Interviewee 15, 011A12:1-2.
355. Interviewee 16, 08A5:6-10.
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[W]hen a difficult case comes forward, and I would say that sexual
harassment is to me the hardest . .. I want it to be reported. I want the
behavior to stop, and I do everything I can to educate my visitors
about what their options are. . . . That's problematic in our field be-
cause if you take sexual harassment as an example, if we report it, or
we come forward with the information or even part of the meeting
where someone lse talks about it, we're part of putting the organiza-
tion on notice. From a purist [sic] point of view, Ombuds are not
supposed to do that.356
Ombuds who resist organizational efforts to encourage reporting
even must subordinate their professional reputations to their commitment
to the confidentiality standard. They also potentially endanger the per-
ceived usefulness of their Ombuds offices. With increased pressure fa-
voring a collaborative institutional approach to identifying and address-
ing sexual misconduct, protecting confidentiality is increasingly a chal-
lenge for Ombuds.
Even if I don't use . . . [the visitor's] name on the phone, the [visitor]
is going to go right over [to that office] and engage in that procedure.
[The personnel in that office will] assume it was that [visitor] that I
called about . .. [and] that compromises confidentiality.357
Given the lack of certain protection for confidentiality, Ombuds are
often dependent on their institutions acting in good faith to uphold the
promise of confidentiality. "[My] [u]niversity basically says, '[Y]ou are
not an office of notice and the University is allowing you to offer confi-
dentiality to the extent permitted by law."' 358 Often, Ombuds practicing
to the archetype must defend against being required or mandated to make
specific reports that will put the institution on notice.
I was vehemently opposed to being a mandated reporter. In fact, my
arguments were persuasive and the University has agreed that I can
be a confidential [office], even in regard to [sexual misconduct].359
[T[he whole cornerstone of Ombudsing is confidentiality,. . . [i]f you
don't have confidentiality and you're not off-the-record and informal
there's no reason to have an Ombud[s] Office.. . . So I honestly
would resign in protest if I had to [be a mandatory reporter on issues
of sexual misconduct].360
Further, because of Title IX requirements and the resulting institu-
tional interest in reporting all known instances of sexual misconduct,
other administrators may view Ombuds who refuse to report violations as
356. Interviewee 5, 014A9:34-10:2.
357. Interviewee 8, 010A8:1-4.
358. Interviewee 6, 09A5:18-20.
359. Interviewee 14, 04A10:23-26.
360. Interviewee 17, 012A8:26, 28-30.
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an impediment to stopping sexual misconduct. Ombuds who adhere to
the confidentiality standard and who do not serve as an office of notice
often must sacrifice their professional reputations. One Ombuds de-
scribed helping a visitor think through the confidentiality of a situation
and how the administration might see the conversation:
[I will say to visitors] "Let's talk about retaliation.. .What might
happen to you if he or she can put two and two togeth-
er?" . . . [W]e're not an office of . .. notice. I think the [administra-
tors] would say "no, don't say anything that might discourage [visi-
tors] from coming forward." 361
Ombuds who adhere to the archetype do, however, make some re-
ports to universities. The question of when and how an Ombuds may
reveal communication is fundamental to the role itself. Ombuds who
follow the archetype draft an annual report detailing numbers of cases
falling into general categories specified by the IOA. These reports may
not provide any information that would identify a visitor. For example,
"things . .. specific to a particular procedure or particular office I do not
report publicly in my annual report.. . . I do report the number of [cases]
I engaged in, but I do not specify . . . what individuals or departments
were involved .... "3 6 2 Another Ombuds noted not using any intake form
for visitors to complete, and in terms of collection of demographic in-
formation, "it is visual, whatever I see [in order to avoid records and
maintain anonymity]."363 Many Ombuds adhering to the archetype also
provide periodic feedback to administrators on trends and potential pro-
cess improvements. For example, an Ombuds explained that she meets
with the president quarterly to talk about the state of the campus, but that
she doesn't provide any information about her cases.3M
Ombuds who give priority to confidentiality often must do so as a
detriment to developing relationships. One Ombuds described being
careful not to put the institution on notice by communicating any infor-
mation from the Ombuds to a university agent capable of receiving no-
tice.
I think that an Ombuds always needs to be aware that unless they're
talking to another Ombudsperson, anybody else they talk with at their
institution they're putting them on notice if they talk about certain
.365
things.
361. Interviewee 18, 01113:30, 32-37.
362. Interviewee 8, 010A3:3-6.
363. Interviewee 19, 07A 11:34-35.
364. Interviewee 5, 014A7:12-14 ("[We have a] meeting with [the president] quarterly [to]
talk about the state of the campus, [but] [w]e don't [provide] any information about our cases at
all.").
365. Interviewee 17, 012A7:38-41.
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Another Ombuds noted the challenge of working at a big university
in a small town.
I think I'm excellent at confidentiality ... [but I have] neighbors on
my block who work at the university, everyone I meet is affiliat-
ed ... [T]here was no one I could talk to about anything I'm doing
other than [with] people [who work] in my office. I would get ques-
tions . .. all the time . . . even [from] people who [understand] the
[functions of an Ombuds] office [but still] say "[c]an you tell me
about this case?" Someone would read an article in the paper and say,
"Are you involved in this?" Constantly, people were .. .asking me if
I knew something about [a] situation and I had to figure out appropri-
ate ways of responding.366
This observation is echoed by another Ombuds who stated, "When
they see [me] walking around, . . . the[y] look [at me and seem to
say] . . . 'I wonder what [he or she] knows' and if they did some-
thing ... they're wondering, 'Well, I wonder if he or she knows about
something that I don't want them to know."'
367
While maintaining confidentiality requires tradeoffs, Ombuds who
adhere to the confidentiality standard also protect impartiality and infor-
mality and support other values, such as trust, safety, reputation, and
self-determination. An Ombuds described his informal process providing
confidentiality and control as key to establishing trust with visitors:
[S]he felt like it was a place she could trust, that it was a place she
could go, have a confidential, off the record discussion, and brain-
storm with someone who knows the university policies and proce-
dures and could advise her on the policy and what to expect and that
type of thing. And I think it really helped her to be able to talk to
someone without fear that it would not be confidential. I think she
did fear [a lack of] confidentiality ... [and] it meant a lot to her that
she had a place to go . . .without giving up that control, and that that
she had time to decide. It felt safe to her and she didn't have to feel
like by coming to me it would automatically get reported. She had
time to process and decide what she wanted to do. I do think the
brainstorming process and just letting her have some time was bene-
ficial. 368
Another Ombuds clearly articulated the same benefits, but by dis-
tinguishing the informal Ombuds practice from more formal processes.
You can't have it both ways. If you're not going to be an agent of no-
tice, and you're going to participate in formal [processes] . . . you
start crossing those other lines. You do not have the right to claim no
366. Interviewee 5, 014A3:25-34.
367. Interviewee 18, 01 Al 1:23-26.
368. Interviewee 17, 012B3:40-52.
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notice and you are not really Ombudsing. . . . Many of the people
who come to me to talk about sexual harassment .. . come to me first
and foremost for a reality check. "This happened to me. It feels like
that. Does that make sense? Is that rational? Do you think someone
else to whom this had occurred might feel that way?" Those are what
draw people here, and if they have to compromise their confidentiali-
ty and provide notice and [be forced into] formal [processes], just to
get those questions answered, they're not going to come. They want a
safe place to come and discuss first, to use the words that some of
them use: "Am I crazy, or is this sexual harassment?" And then a safe
and trusted place to come to say, "ok, if I wanted to do something
about it, what are the kinds of things I might consider doing?" With-
out obligating themselves to do any of them. And those are two func-
tions that we as Ombudsmen can perform only because we are not
agents of notice and we are confidential.369
Many Ombuds described safety as the reason they would only re-
port on an individual situation if the visitor provides them with permis-
s1on.
[I]f someone came to me about a sexual harassment issue and didn't
want to deal with it until they left the organization, either graduated
as a student or got another job or something like that and then they
gave me permission to go forward I would figure out a way to do that
even if it's just one person. Sexual harassment, you don't peck at
numbers, [someone might say] "it's just one." But if I [do not have
permission, and I] have to maintain . .. anonymity, I'm never going
to be able to go forward. These situations are too unique . ... 99.9%
of the time all I can do is try to work with my visitor to try to see if
there's a way that they're comfortable going forward them-
selves .... I just feel like that person is very vulnerable, and I can't
do anything to endanger them. It really ties my hands ... . I don't
think I've ever been in a situation where I felt I could provide enough
anonymity for my visitors that I could go forward with those is-
370sues.
Ombuds widely discussed their views on how and when they might
share confidential communications, with many discussing the level of
anonymity necessary in order to make a disclosure. One Ombuds com-
mented,
The only way we can [report], and I think it would almost never hap-
pen with racial discrimination or sexual harassment, is if we had
enough complaints that we felt we could go forward with the report
without identifying any individual visitor. It's extremely rare that that
369. Interviewee 8, Ol0A 1:41-12:19.
370. Interviewee 5, 014A11:27-34, 16-18; 9:1-2.
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happens in my experience .. . because typically it's only one person
who's being affected at a time.3 71
Another Ombuds who adheres to the archetype indicated only re-
porting on general trends: "[I] provide upward feedback on trends and
,372patterns I have seen ... ." The same Ombuds further notes,
[I]f it's an isolated incident, I won't report it. And I don't know
where that line is honestly, but when I feel it's a trend, [and] I feel
like I've heard enough of the complaints ... I can say to the Dean,
"I've had several students come to me and here is the theme that I'm
hearing. This ... might constitute a pattern or trend, and . . . you
might want to look into [the situation]. But know that I have not
talked to the [unit director]." And saying it in that way, there's no
way that the Dean would know who came to see me, and who they
came to see me about. Especially in a big unit, you know, that deals
with students from all over the university.373
Reporting on general trends becomes even easier for the adhering-
to-the-archetype Ombuds when the issue is one of policy or procedural
irregularity.
I would certainly bring [a systemic issue] to the attention of the peo-
ple I report to or to the unit . . . even if it's sexual harass-
ment ... . [I]f it is a problem with the policy and it's not a problem
with a certain person . . . I would certainly bring [it] up to the person
who deals with sexual harassment.374
An Ombuds described confidentiality and the trust and safety it en-
genders as a motivating factor that leads people to seek out the office.
Well, I know why they came to me; they came to me because I'm
trusted. They knew it was a safe place to come and that they wouldn't
be outed and that their confidentiality would be honored here, and
there aren't a whole lot of place [sic] on this campus [where that is
the case].375
I've said this to our [formal offices] . . . "[t]here are ticking time
bombs out there that you're never going to find out about because
people are afraid to come forward because they can't go someplace
and just talk about it and feel safe about having that conversation."376
Maintaining confidentiality and building trust is also a way for Om-
buds who adhere to the archetype to develop reputations as safe, reliable
371. Interviewee 5, 014A8:29-33.
372. Interviewee 17, 012A5:41-43.
373. Interviewee 17, 012Bl3:29-36.
374. Interviewee 17, 012A8:8-13.
375. Interviewee 8, 010B3:33-36.
376. Interviewee 19, 07A17:21-26.
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offices to bring concerns. This is especially important given misconcep-
tions about confidentiality are commonplace, as indicated by an Ombuds
who explained, "[t]here are misconceptions about confidentiality. A lot
of people think that we automatically call the supervisor involved or
[other formal office], and we'll report things."m Another Ombuds dis-
cussed the importance of building a reputation for maintaining confiden-
tiality:
[I]f you're one step removed from the back channel that has a lot of
control over information going upwards or not at all, then you're not
compromised by it. But it's dangerous because this is where
knowledge is power, and people want to know what you know, be-
cause if you maintain your confidentiality, your principles and your
self-discipline, you don't divulge who comes to your office, what is
said, [and] people know that's your function. And they know you're
not one to talk.378
Helping visitors explore potential options without requiring them to pur-
sue any particular avenue is a common activity of Ombuds who follow
the archetype.
I'm really showing [the visitor] "look, I'm not a little naive, here. I
understand that there's politics and people who can get nas-
ty.. .. [The institution] can only protect you to a point. So I want to
make sure that if you want me to go forward, and I'm more than hap-
py to go forward, I want to make sure that you're thinking about all
the other angles that you may not have thought about."379
Another Ombuds noted,
I just talk it through with the visitor to see if they have any other ide-
as about how [they might come forward in a way that is acceptable to
them] .. . so I do [pose hypotheticals] but .. . I do not have any kind
of rules written down or anything like that.380
Ultimately, the same Ombuds concluded,
[A] lot of time people are bothered by something but they can't quite
put their finger on what they're bothered about. . . . [Visitors] just
[want] a place to figure [it] out . .. without worrying about having to
[take the issue further] if [they don't] want [it] to.381
For Ombuds who comply with the archetype, discussion about op-
tions includes both informal and formal methods. The following Ombuds
377. Interviewee 5, 014Al7:35-37.
378. Interviewee 18, OlAl 1:15-22.
379. Interviewee 18, 01B13:39-14:3.
380. Interviewee 19, 07Al2:32-13:4.
381. Interviewee 19, 07B2:43-3:6.
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described how confidentiality impacts the ability of Title IX Coordina-
tors to provide informal coaching.
One distinction, one important distinction is that in the course of [a]
conversation, if [you] say for example . . . "[H]e made a sexual ges-
ture towards me" . . . [the Title IX Coordinator] may be obligat-
ed ... to respond to that [and force you into a formal pro-
cess] . . . . Well, I can hear [those things] and have that conversation
[but] leave [you] in control of how ... to proceed.382
One Ombuds wrestling with this distinction articulated the priority of
maintaining confidentiality over reporting sexual misconduct.
I would hope that I could be persuasive enough with one or more of
the victims here that would put them in a place where they would be
willing to speak to our Title IX coordinators or the police to go ahead
and file reports about that or request a release from their confidential-
ity promise so I could do something on their behalf. I really do,
again, think that it is a critical part of the service that I offer that it is
confidential and would really protect that value, even at the risk of
some others.383
One Ombuds described the role as "a keeper of secrets" and confi-
dentiality as the aspect "where [Ombuds] start to [earn their] trust and
that's where [the Ombuds'] power comes, because people . .. know that
you keep your word and you preserve their confidences."384 In sum, Om-
buds who adhere to the archetype seem deeply committed to the princi-
ple of confidentiality, even though maintaining this commitment requires
a tradeoff of other values like relationships, access, efficiency, reputa-
tion, and stopping egregious behavior. Maintaining confidentiality also
protects other standards like impartiality and informality and supports
values like trust, safety, reputation, and self-determination. The next Part
describes the impartiality and independence requirements of Ombuds and
the resulting benefits to the university.
F. Ombuds' Impartiality and Independence Obligations
Title IX Coordinators are to be impartial to the interests of both the
complainant and the respondent but partial to the goals and requirements
of the law. Ombuds' impartiality and independence provides the larger
compliance system with legitimacy and supports the formal compliance
offices in their missions. For example, one Ombuds described a visitor
who wanted her to resolve their issue formally:
I talked about [formal options and told her] "there are plenty of peo-
ple on campus that can do that" . . . and [I] referred this person to
382. Interviewee 20, 013B4:26-32.
383. Interviewee 14, 04A9:39-10:5.
384. Interviewee 18, 01A5:4, 7-10.
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some of those people if she wanted to exercise that option. There is
nobody else on campus that has confidentiality, independence, and
neutrality, so if I [handle complaints formally], not only am I dupli-
cating an existing service, I am negating the unique and essential
function of my role.385
Independence requires that Ombuds and their offices are independ-
ent from other organizational entities 3 8 6 and hold no other organizational
position that might compromise independence.387 Specifically, independ-
ence requires that the Ombuds report directly to the highest level of the
organization, with an employment status indicating that they are not sub-
ordinate to senior officials. Functionally, independence means operating
"independently from control, limitation, or interference."3 8 8 Although
employed by the university and typically reporting to the president, Om-
buds sit outside the formal administrative structure. A survey of higher
education Ombuds found that most university Ombuds report high up in
the organization and are independent of lower-level supervisors.389 Om-
buds have several sources of authority other than managerial position.
These include the ability to gain access to information, the ability to es-
tablish professional relationships with the very top of the organization,
the ability to recommend cases to more formal options, their problem-
solving skills, and their personal credibility based in charisma and moral
authority.390 Because extensive knowledge of the organization and its
operations is important, most Ombuds are picked from within the organi-
zation.391 Ombuds' independence also requires the Ombuds to retain sole
discretion with how to act regarding specific concerns or observed
trends,392 to have access to all organizational information and individuals
as permitted by law, 393 and to have the ability to select their own staff
and manage their budget and operations.394
Impartiality requires Ombuds to be "neutral, impartial, and una-
ligned," while "striv[ing] for impartiality, fairness and objectivity in the
treatment of people and the consideration of issues. " This includes not
385. Interviewee 8, 010B5:17-22.
386. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, at § 1.1.
387. Id. § 1.2.
388. IOA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 304, § 1.1 cmt. at 2.
389. SANDRA R. HAYDEN, THE OMBUDS OFFICE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (Educ, Res. Info.
Ctr., U.S. Dep't of Educ. photo. reprint 1998) (1997), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED415784.pdf
(finding that thirty-eight of the fifty-eight responding Ombuds reported to the President, Chancellor,
or Vice-President and Provost levels of the organization).
390. Andrea McGrath, The Corporate Ombuds Office: An ADR Tool No Company Should Be
Without, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 452, 473-74 (1997).
391. Id. at 471; Mary P. Rowe, The Corporate Ombudsman: An Overview and Analysis, 3
NEGOT. J. 127,137 (1987).
392. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 1.3.
393. Id. § 1.4.
394. Id. § 1.5.
395. Id. §§ 2.1, 2.2; see also IOA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 304, §§ 2.1, 2.2.
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advocating on behalf of any individual within the organization and advo-
cating for processes that are fair and equitably administered.
Impartiality and independence are strongly related to the confidenti-
ality obligation. Maintaining confidentiality can also be a means of en-
suring impartiality, as indicated by one Ombuds:
I explain [to visitors] that I don't keep records and if they want me to
read something I will, but [afterwards] I'll either shred it or give it
back to them. So I'm really clear about that. And I explain one of the
reasons is because we are neutral and I don't want to have documents
that could result in having to become a witness in [a formal pro-
cess] . . . . That would mean I'm not a neutral person. I would have to
be on one side of a case or another. I don't want to do that.396
Another Ombuds echoed the advantage to impartiality of maintaining
confidentiality:
I would not report it naming any student ever without their permis-
sion, nor would I name the individual about whom a complaint has
been made multiple times. However, one tool that I know some of
my colleagues use occasionally is the sort of generic option . .. [of]
going to an administrator with responsibility over the alleged har-
asser and suggest that some sort of training effort might be advanta-
geous for the entire unit. But I think it's important that Ombuds re-
main neutral and not be in that leading the lynch mob kind of role.397
In order to provide confidentiality, Ombuds must protect both their
impartiality and independence. Used incorrectly, Ombuds' confidentiali-
ty, impartiality, and independence can be used to protect perpetrators.
Ombuds David Miller notes,
Knowledge is responsibility, and those in the know must also be held
responsible for not acting on what they know if not acting betrays the
public trust.. . . [F]or some, Ombudsman informality offers too much
ambiguity, and confidentiality is seen as conspiracy to preserve the
interests of such perpetrators against the exercise of justice . . . . Who
could not want to see perpetrators of sexual violence or any other
kind of violence . . . exposed to the full consequence of their actions,
along with those who knowingly abet their horrible behavior?398
Proponents of formal reporting mechanisms see the archetypal Om-
buds model's informality and confidentiality as a Band-Aid for the fail-
ures in formal processes and prefer to solve the problem at its source by
improving the formal process. The ultimate weakness of the Ombuds
archetype's confidentiality system occurs when individuals decide not to
396. Interviewee 19, 07A11:27-33.
397. Interviewee 21, 02A7:32-8:2.
398. Miller, supra note 82, at 6.
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pursue their complaints. While many conflicts do not involve allegations
of legal wrongdoing, sexual harassment can involve organizational iabil-
ity and the violation of individuals' rights. To what extent does the Om-
buds archetype's principle against reporting such behaviors and lack of
notice to the institution exacerbate efforts to elicit complaints of and pre-
vent illegal behavior? The next Section describes Ombuds departing
from the archetype and prescribes ways of ensuring Ombuds adhere to
the model's obligations. Ombuds conforming to the model provide es-
sential support to the formal compliance mechanism and ensure individ-
ual self-determination and autonomy. Ombuds non-conforming to the
IOA Standards harm compliance efforts and assist in sweeping abuses
under the rug. Ombuds non-conforming to the standards must be manda-
tory reporters for the purposes of sexual misconduct.
IV. UNIVERSITIES NEED ORGANIZATIONAL OMBUDS THAT ADHERE TO
THE IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
Confidentiality encourages and supports victims in coming forward,
but it also masks problems and may inhibit an institution's ability to ad-
dress serious issues. On one hand is the Ombuds: "[A] silky-voiced char-
acter who manipulates the hapless, under resourced Employee or Con-
sumer through various cognitive heuristics into willingly foregoing meri-
torious claims, thus protecting the organization from shouldering costs
associated with investigation, procedure and possible impacts on human
resources."399 Inherently the question of Ombuds' confidentiality is one
of whether it simply becomes a mechanism by which universities may
insulate themselves from liability.
On the other hand is the Title IX Coordinator set on establishing an
official precedent and dragging hapless individuals through an official
process that they may greatly wish to avoid and which further harms
their emotional health. The ultimate question is how can institutions en-
courage victims to come forward? Both formal and informal mechanisms
are valuable for encouraging reporting but no one mechanism can pro-
vide for confidentiality and at the same time bring forward complaints
for appropriate disposition. Because currently neither Ombuds nor Coor-
dinators adhere to their respective archetypes, universities face increased
liability risks, survivors and alleged perpetrators have fewer procedural
choices, and processes lack legitimacy.
A. Ombuds Departing From the Archetype
Ombuds interviewed were frequently observed to depart from the
confidentiality guidelines and the related impartiality guidelines. One




Ombuds described the difficulty in remaining impartial while providing
the visitor with control:
I've never [sent something] through a grievance procedure [because I
have] never seen anybody win their case. I don't want to say that I
deter people from [formal options]. What I do is I usually recom-
mend that they talk to the [formal personnel] confidentially to get a
feel for what that process might be like, and then decide if that's
something that they'll want to do or if it's something that I can help
them out with. [Right now the formal process is] ... a system of frus-
tration for students and staff and faculty to utilize [as] I've never seen
any[one] [win a case against a victimizer]. 400
One Ombuds described a clear departure from the impartiality standard:
[If a policy has been violated] we'll try to talk to the offending per-
son and see if there was a mistake made and if they want to correct
[it]. And if they don't want to correct that and we think that it was a
violation of policy and we give them an opportunity to make it right
and they don't, then we'll probably go on to their supervisor and
work our way up the chain.401
Whenever we get into something that looks like it truly is sexual har-
assment or borderline sexual harassment or racial discrimination, I
always try to involve [the formal office]. I try to get the person in my
office to walk over [to the formal office] and file a complaint with
them, because as much as I'm willing to entertain people's com-
plaints about that and will promise them confidentiality, if they insist
on it, I really think that everybody's better served by going on the
record with all that.402
Ombuds also noted a goal of making sure the administration is
aware of problems that could cause damage to the institution, which is a
departure from the impartiality and independent guidelines:
[T]here are three [exceptions to confidentiality]. One is any time
somebody discloses bodily harm to self or others, we can't keep that
in confidence, or any disclosures of child or elder abuse, that can't be
kept in confidence, and then the other, the third area is if someone
was to disclose that they had knowledge of somebody's life or health
being at risk, then we would have to disclose that to the appropriate
authorities... . Sometimes I have to make an executive decision. If
something doesn't fall in those domains but if I think about it and
over time it's going to do significant damage to the institution I
might decide to do something with that information. But I have to be
careful because people didn't give me express permission to go for-
ward .... [So] if I [go forward it is] because I weighed it and I said
400. Interviewee 16, 08A12:20-26, 13:11-14.
401. Interviewee 6, 09A14:3-9.
402. Interviewee 6, 09Bl:29-34.
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"you know, this office needs to be aware of this, it may cause signifi-
cant damage to the institution" and so part of my job as an Ombuds-
man is to give decision makers a head's up.403
Regarding confidentiality, Ombuds who depart from the archetype
often serve as notice to the institution, both in their ability to receive no-
tice and in reporting in ways that violate confidentiality and anonymity.
Ombuds often described visitors' expectations about confidentiality:
Most people think, almost invariably, when people come to me about
discrimination, that they're coming to get something on the record. In
fact, about a third of the people that come through the office think
they [are] putting something on the record.. . . They want me to
make note, put it on the record, put it in [my] files because down the
road when they are fired or something else happens [someone will
know] this happened.404
Sometimes universities require Ombuds to report any instances of
sexual harassment that they learn about. This policy directly violates the
norm of confidentiality and places the Ombuds in a difficult position:
[Mandatory reporting is] [t]he nightmare for an Ombuds Office, and
there are [many] Ombuds offices who have to deal with this . . . [I]f a
sexual harassment complaint is reported we have to report it
[and] . . . put the campus on [notice]. So basically the university is
being put on notice ... by the visitor coming to us.405
Often Ombuds are required to report all instances of sexual miscon-
duct. One Ombuds noted, "I know some Ombuds Offices have to report
sexual harassment but to me that's against the standards of practice and
what's the point of having an Ombuds Office if it's going to be treated
like a formal office."406 Another Ombuds described his general counsel
as "not feel[ing] good at all about the privilege of the Ombudsperson,
and of course most forms of harassment are not illegal .. . but you've got
to go with [what] each organization and general counsel feels comforta-
ble with." 407 This observation is echoed by other Ombuds who have an
organizational obligation to report issues of sexual misconduct. For ex-
ample, a Title IX Coordinator explained when a visitor's statements must
be reported:
[I]f it's something that I really do need to know about, [the Ombuds]
will advise [the visitor] that they . .. speak to me or, depending upon
the nature of it, there's a duty for [the Ombuds] to report it if it [is]
403. Interviewee 18, 01A9:33-40, 10:10-18.
404. Interviewee 6, 09B3:6-7, 27-29.
405. Interviewee 5, 014B10:39-11:3.
406. Interviewee 17, 012A8:22-24.
407. Interviewee 16, 08A5:15-19.
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something. . . illegal or immoral or indecent the Ombuds [has] to re-
port it.408
An Ombuds added, "if there's anything that comes to me that is
sexual harassment in nature I do contact our [Title IX Coordinator] to let
them know, as well [when] there's anything that is clearly reporta-
ble... ."409 Ombuds who are required by their universities to report in-
stances of sexual misconduct often seek to limit this obligation:
I used the hierarchical arrangement as my justification for not report-
ing [sexual harassment]. I didn't want to [report] unless I absolutely
had to. If push came to shove and for some reason we ended up in lit-
igation or something like that I would have taken the position that I
didn't tell anybody because I didn't see it as . . . [involving a] power
disparity ... .410
Other Ombuds depart from the archetype by participating in infor-
mational meetings with other formal offices. A Title IX Coordinator de-
scribed periodic meetings with general counsel, other formal offices, and
the Ombuds where everyone "go[es] around the room and talk[s] about
what's going on, cases in a general sense, just kind of bounce things off
[one another] so we're in the loop on what's going on."4 1 1 Another Om-
buds noted,
I can go to [the formal office] and say 'are you hearing from the staff
in this department too? Is there anything we can do, maybe we can go
talk to the director of that area. Which one of us has the best rapport
with that person to give them a heads up that there's something brew-
ing ... that they might want to look at.' 4 12
Some Ombuds report to an upper level administrator and have ad-
ministrative functions but do not see themselves as offices of notice. For
example, one Ombuds, despite reporting directly to a member of the
President's Cabinet and having a "very close-knit" relationship, stated
that "[N]otice would have to go either through our Dean of Students of-
fice or through our legal [counsel]."413 The Ombuds then clarified that
the privilege of confidentiality does not belong to the visitor or the Om-
buds, but rather to the office. As a result the Ombuds believed he could
maintain confidentiality while sitting in that role.414
408. Interviewee 2, T4A8:18-22.
409. Interviewee 22, 06A4:19-21.
410. Interviewee 19, 07B12:3-17.
411. Interviewee 3, T13A5:22-25.
412. Interviewee 8, O10Al0:37-41.
413. Interviewee 22, 06A6:26, 18-19.
414. Interviewee 15, 01 1A 4:19-22, 12:17 ("The [privilege of] confidentiality belongs not to
[the visitor] or to me, it belongs to the office, [providing me with the ability to maintain confidential-
ity when in that role].").
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Many of the examples discussed above illustrate how Ombuds re-
spond to pressure from superiors to give a report, thereby violating the
archetype by breaching confidentiality or failing to protect visitors' ano-
nymity. For example, one Ombuds noted that when the formal office
"call[s] me. . . and they ask me if somebody's come to [my] office I will
let them know. If I would say 'I can't tell you, I'm not going to tell you,'
that would not go over very well." 415 In another example, a Title IX Co-
ordinator reported hearing rumors from faculty members, but explained,
"I didn't know who and I didn't know what exactly.... [T]hen the Om-
buds came to me and gave me the who and the what and I took
it . .. from there."4 16
Ombuds who depart from the archetype give priority to reporting
over confidentiality obligations. For example, Ombuds described provid-
ing hypotheticals: "[W]hen I have . . . conversation[s] with our [Title IX
Coordinator], I'll [provide] a list of ... [three] hypothetical offices [with
one of them being the actual office]. [The Coordinator] may have already
heard [about which office it is], and [the Coordinator] has told me that
[it's] very helpful. ... 417 Another Ombuds noted the point at which
they value stopping misconduct over adhering to the archetype:
[W]hen multiple people have reported to me . .. [and] when I see the
same thing from a few different perspectives, I'll begin to believe
that there might be something going on, and I might say to a depart-
ment chair, "You know, I don't know that this is really true, but you
might want to sensitize yourself to this, there might be something out
there. "418
Another noted breaking confidentiality to take credit for a successful
outcome and thus build their professional worth:
[E]verything that I had recommended to the student, unbeknownst to
me, the student followed through [with] in terms of.. .making [it]
happen. I specifically [told] my boss, "[E]ven though there's no men-
tion of the Ombudsman .. . this started in [my] office and I will una-
bashedly take credit for it." 419
Perhaps paradoxically, examples indicate Ombuds often breach
confidentiality in order to build relationships:
So a tough part of this job, listening to some of these things, not be-
ing able to share confidences . . . . I follow[ed] up with the [Title IX
Coordinator to say], "I'm aware this student brought [an issue] to my
415. Interviewee 19, 07A7:44-46.
416. Interviewee 11, T 11A17:11-15.
417. Interviewee 20, 013B6:32-38.
418. Interviewee 23, 03A7:6-7, 14-18.
419. Interviewee 15, 01I B7:24-29.
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attention that your office handled, [because the student was] upset
because he felt like there was no response that was helpful ....
The Title IX Coordinator is an attorney . .. [who] takes a very legal-
istic approach . . . [and] is not one of the people that I can go to and
say "have you been hearing things about [this] department? What's
going on over there? Have we got a faculty member losing it over
there? Do we need as an institution to think about stepping in and do-
ing something over there? Would it help if I went and talked with the
chair or you went and talked with the chair?" [There are a few staff
members in these offices] with whom I have a relationship like
that ... [but their bosses] don't know .... [The staff] trust me and
know that I won't out them and need my input.421
Other Ombuds are clear about confidentiality boundaries, "As far as
sexual assault, which I would consider a serious crime, I say I can't
guarantee confidentiality."422 The lack of certainty regarding confidenti-
ality and the lack of control provided to visitors was often cited as a rea-
son for declining numbers of visitors. For example,
[W]e're not getting as many people coming to this office because we
can't provide them with a level of confidentiality that would ensure
that if they don't want the information disclosed if they were to re-
port sexual harassment, for example, that we would be duty bound to
respect that. . . . I believe that's one of the reasons . . . they don't
come to our office because we can't offer them that blanket confiden-
tiality that they're looking for.423
Ombuds who depart from the archetype undermine visitors' self-
determination as to whether to use formal processes. Many Ombuds do
not offer a choice and directly refer visitors to the Title IX Coordinator.
For example, an Ombuds noted, "Any time that I've dealt with [sexual
misconduct] I've worked with the individual really to get to the [Title IX
Coordinator] and file a complaint."4 24 This is echoed by another Om-
buds: "We [can] explore the different ways to surface the issue, but ulti-
mately I would make it clear [to visitors] that [sexual misconduct] did
have to [be reported] for [everyone's] ... benefit."425 Other Ombuds
attempt to secure their visitors' permission to report or to report the in-
formation anonymously. Often in doing so this "anonymous" infor-
mation makes it possible to identify the individuals involved. Ombuds
also make decisions about when to report that fall outside of their report-
ing requirements:
420. Interviewee 16, 08B9:40-43.
421. Interviewee 8, 010A9:45-10:20.
422. Interviewee 16, 08A6:16-17.
423. Interviewee 19, 07A6:12-16; 07B2:3-6.
424. Interviewee 23, 03A7:19-21.
425. Interviewee 19, 07B4:28-31.
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[T]here are three [exceptions to confidentiality]. One is any time
somebody discloses bodily harm to self or others, we can't keep that
in confidence, or any disclosures of child or elder abuse, that can't be
kept in confidence, and then the other, the third area is if someone
was to disclose that hey had knowledge of somebody's life or health
being at risk, then we would have to disclose that to the appropriate
authorities.... Sometimes I have to make an executive decision. If
something doesn't falls in those domains but if I think about it and
over time it's going to do significant damage to the institution I
might decide to do something with that information. But I have to be
careful because people didn't give me express permission to go for-
ward .... [So] if I [go forward it is] because I weighed it and I said
"you know, this office needs to be aware of this, it may cause signifi-
cant damage to the institution" and so part of my job as an Ombuds-
man is to give decision-makers a heads up.426
Another Ombuds similarly described subordinating confidentiality to
anything that would cause "massive disruption" to the institution:
[E]verything is confidential unless there is any sort of self-harm that
is reported or anything that would cause any massive disruption to
the institution. So those are the things that I often say to a student, "I
won't go forward unless you give me permission to use your name,
but if there is any talk of [those] particular things, then I do have to
report it [regardless of your permission]."427
Ombuds frequently described seeking the survivor's permission to
take an anonymous approach, but many expressed ultimately doing
whatever was necessary to get the complaint filed:
[If I were unable to convince a potential victim of sexual misconduct
to come forward] the [next step] would be [to say] "[O]kay, so you're
not willing to do this, can you allow me to, in an indirect way, go to
the department chair and say '[Y]ou need to go to the [Title IX Coor-
dinator] and let them know that there are allegations that this faculty
member is engaging in this kind of behavior."' Kind of going in an
indirect way.... [Another] Ombuds ... told me that we would never
do nothing, we would keep moving forward until this thing got ad-
dressed. That would be my commitment. I would do whatever it
would take.428
Another Ombuds described trying to marshal multiple complaints, not
for the purpose of protecting each individual's confidentiality, but to
provide proof of what might be occurring:
[U]nless some other people come and tell me the same thing I'm not
going to be able to go to the supervisor and have a lot of influence
426. Interviewee 18, 01A9:33-40, 10:10-18.
427. Interviewee 22, 06A4:8-13.
428. Interviewee 19, 07A9:2-9, 13-16.
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because I'm going to be saying "one person told me this and I can't
tell you who it was, and I can't offer you any proof without identify-
ing this one person." [I tell the visitor], "[I]f you've got other [indi-
viduals who have experienced this] . . . have them call me and tell me
that they would like to be included as part of a class who are com-
plaining about this, then I can go to the supervisor and say 'well, I've
had [multiple] people [tell] me the same thing."'
429
When handling new cases, Ombuds often require visitors to fill out
intake forms that this Ombuds described as "formal":
There [is] a formal intake process. The student . . . come[s] to my of-
fice and [we have] intake forms . . . . Basically their basic infor-
mation, student information. We . . . ask them [about] the [type] of
complaint, was it academic, was it judicial, [which] department,
[which] faculty person, was it personal, was it a hostile eva-
-430sion ... .4
Ombuds who depart from the archetype also often require visitors'
sign written waivers of their confidentiality rights:
Sometimes students will waive their right to confidentiality, and I
have them sign a specific waiver . . . that says [the visitor] allow[s]
[and permits me] to speak to person X and Y, sometimes it's as spe-
cific as a name, [and] I can speak to that person and that person
alone. Sometimes they don't know [who I should talk to], they just
say "anyone over in the department," or "anyone you need to [speak
with] to fix this."431
Ombuds who require visitors to sign a waiver of confidentiality often do
so during the intake:
[W]hen a student [comes] in to see me I ask them to first sign a
waiver ... and I would tell them "based on whatever you tell me,
based on your particular situation I may need to talk to people," and I
would ask them to sign off, giving me permission to talk to particular
people or offices about their situation.432
In sum, my interviews with Ombuds thus reveal a complex tug-of-
war between competing impulses. On the one hand, the archetypal Om-
buds model motivates many Ombuds to strictly honor their visitors' con-
fidentiality and interest in self-determination, even when doing so seems
deeply frustrating as abusive sexual predators seem to get away with
misconduct again and again. On the other hand, many Ombuds find ways
to get information to responsible authorities within their institutions-or
429. Interviewee 6, 09B4:14-22.
430. Interviewee 24, 05A9:12-17.
431. Interviewee 14, 04A7:4-9.
432. Interviewee 24, 05A7:2-6.
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are required by their institutions to do so-even though this sometimes
exposes their visitors to the loss of confidentiality that they sought to
avoid by coming to the Ombuds. To encourage reports of sexual miscon-
duct, IOA-conforming Ombuds are essential for compliance with Ti-
tle IX.
B. How to Reform University Ombuds
Many years ago, Paul Verkuil noted how the pervasive model of le-
gal formality is likely to push Ombuds toward greater formality:
The ombudsman's potential as a procedural system is largely bound
up with our commitment to the adversary system. The ombudsman
and adversary systems are substantially competing procedures for the
regularization of informal processes; each is based on a different
conception of the dispute resolution process and reflects different un-
derlying social and political values. While the two systems could co-
exist in harmony if spheres of influence were delineated reflecting
the appropriateness of their respective procedures, the spread of the
adversary system, in response to the perceived commands of proce-
dural due process, into many areas of administrative decisionmaking
has stymied the development of the ombudsman alternative.433
University Ombuds need reform in order to avoid the push of formality.
First, Title IX law and policy must require non-conforming Ombuds
to be mandatory reporters. Non-conforming Ombuds increase the risk of
liability and provide no true alternative to the formal reporting system.
This is especially important given recent evidence that universities only
offer a more accurate portrayal of campus sexual assault during a De-
partment of Education audit.434 The research also demonstrates that au-
dits have "no long-term effect on the reported levels of sexual assault, as
those crime rates returned to previous levels after an audit was complet-
ed."435 Ombuds conforming to the IOA Standards, however, should not
be mandatory reporters. An IOA ad hoc Title IX Task Force, created to
"draw attention to the vital role the confidential ombuds can play on col-
436lege campuses," reached the same conclusion. Fighting the label of
"responsible employee,"437 the Task Force commissioned a report, au-
433. Paul R. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 845, 846 (1975).
434. Corey Rayburn Yung, Concealing Campus Sexual Assault. An Empirical Examination,
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L., Feb. 2015, at 1, I (describing an increase in reports of sexual assault of
approximately 44% during audit periods).
435. Id at 5 (noting previous levels of reporting returned even in instances when fines were
issued for non-compliance).
436. Letter from IOA Bd. of Dirs. to IOA Membership (Apr. 1, 2016) (reproducing Memoran-
dum from Bruce M. Berman, Partner, Wilmer Hale, to Bd. of Dirs., Int'l Ombudsman Ass'n (Mar.
14, 2016)), https://www.ombudsassociation.org/IOAMain/media/SiteFiles/docs/Wilmer-Hale-
memo-and-cover-March-2016.pdf.
437. See supra notes 238-43 and accompanying text.
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thored by Attorney Bruce Berman, titled Campus Ombuds as Confiden-
tial Resource for Purposes of Title IX and Clery Act Reporting.438 The
report argues the Ombuds role need not be structured to meet OCR's
definition of "responsible employee," and that OCR's definition of con-
fidential resources does not require an Ombuds be a member of any cer-
tain profession or hold a legal privilege.43 9
For Ombuds conforming to the IOA Standards, universities need to
push for clear confidentiality protections. OCR's Q&A document does
not specifically mention Ombuds and does not provide Ombuds with the
ability to maintain confidentiality." 0 Even assuming OCR approval, sig-
nificant liability concerns arise when organizational actors like Ombuds
are independent of the organizational structure and not mandated to re-
port, yet are able to hear and informally handle sexual misconduct con-
cerns. Although Ombuds promise confidentiality, whether this promise is
legally enforceable beyond OCR requirements remains unclear. The
June, 2016 edition of the Department of Education's Handbook for
Campus Safety and Reporting lists Ombuds in the list of examples of
positions meeting the criteria for being campus security authorities and
thus mandatory reporters."1 Additionally, there is little case law protect-
ing the confidentiality of communications with Ombuds, and often the
level of confidentiality is controlled by the organization itself. No U.S.
state embraces the ombudsman privilege as it is envisioned under the
IOA Standards.442 A federal court common law privilege is sometimes
recognized for employee communications with an Ombuds.4" To receive
protection, Ombuds must widely and consistently publicize information
in print and online that consistently asserts the office's confidentiality.44
Such publications may form the basis for an "implied contract" that im-
plies using an Ombuds program is conditioned on acceptance of the of-
fice's principles."5 Confidentiality is complicated as the level of confi-
dentiality is controlled by the organization employing the Ombuds, creat-
ing potential problems of conflicts of interests and potential breaches of
446confidentiality. Universities and their Ombuds must work together to
438. Letter from IOA Bd. of Dirs. to IOA Membership, supra note 436.
439. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 15 (defining
responsible employee as any employee with the authority to take action to redress sexual violence;
who has been given the duty of reporting incidents of sexual violence or any other misconduct by
students to the Title IX Coordinator; or whom a student could reasonably believe has this authority
or duty); Letter from IOA Bd. of Dirs. to IOA Membership, supra note 436, at 5-7.
440. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 16-17.
441. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE HANDBOOK FOR CAMPUS SAFETY AND SECURITY REPORTING:
2016 EDITION 4-3 (2016), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook.pdf.
442. Van Soye, supra note 270, at 128.
443. Kendall D. Isaac, The Organizational Ombudsman's Quest for Privileged Communica-
tions, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 31, 36-39 (2014).
444. HOWARD, supra note 259, at 282-88.
445. Id. at 252-53.
446. Jessica Oser, Note, The Unguided Use of International ADR Programs to Resolve Sexual
Harassment Controversies in the Workplace, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 283, 295-97 (2005).
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craft the contours of the role in a way that ensures confidentiality without
exposing the institution to liability.
To do so, universities must develop specific sexual misconduct re-
porting guidelines for Ombuds. Allowing people to make anonymous
reports of incidents of sexual misconduct may fulfill both Coordinators'
and Ombuds' core goals as long as the reports do not identify, or can
lead to the identification of, any specific person or department. Anony-
mous reporting may enable Ombuds to collect otherwise unreported in-
cidents of sexual misconduct. Title IX Coordinators will then gain im-
portant feedback about weaknesses in policy, procedures, or where im-
provements can be made to better educate the campus about sexual mis-
conduct. Instead of asking questions about their reporting obligations to
reporting authorities, Mandatory Reporters on campus gain an additional
resource to consult regarding their obligations prior to actually reporting.
Ombuds' ability to help visitors think through their informal and formal
resolution options may lead more visitors to make formal reports. In
sum, University Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds must work together
to define the contours of reporting requirements.
CONCLUSION
Although both Title IX Coordinator and Ombuds models presuma-
bly share a preference for eliminating sexual misconduct, the archetypal
offices reflect very different philosophies and mechanisms for handling
complaints. Where Ombuds see absolute confidentiality and the self-
determination it provides as a necessary condition for eliciting and han-
dling complaints in the face of retaliation, Title IX Coordinators reflect a
compliance regime that seeks to elicit formal complaints and then disci-
pline, prevent, and eliminate instances of sexual misconduct.
While some Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators adhere strictly to
their respective archetypes on the matter of confidentiality, many depart
considerably from these commitments. These Ombuds breach confiden-
tiality in the interest of nabbing a perpetrator or reforming a departmental
environment. The Title IX Coordinators naturally depart in the other
direction. Some give priority to the individuai complainant's wishes or
feelings over the institutional interest in investigation and enforcement.
Others misleadingly give the impression of being prepared to maintain
confidences, but only to draw the complainant into letting down her
guard to reveal information that she might not otherwise divulge. As a
result, confidentiality illustrates the tension between individual self-
determination and broader organizational interests.
Universities are struggling to balance institutional concerns with in-
dividual rights. Donna Shestowsky notes self-determination and institu-
tional efficiency often work at cross-purposes, making justice difficult to
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obtain.447 While the Trump Administration will change the contours of
enforcement, colleges and universities must continue to determine the
best practices for complying with Title IX. Until universities (1) find
reliable mechanisms for drawing out complaints and (2) develop con-
sistent, fair means of handling disputes, it will be impossible to address
the deeper rooted social norms related to alcohol abuse and sexual mis-
conduct. Instead of a zero-sum game of reporting or not reporting,
providing confidential sources of reporting can be a means of encourag-
ing greater reporting and providing survivors and alleged perpetrators
with self-determination. Universities need both Ombuds and Title IX
Coordinators.
ATIXA's website describes the confusion surrounding Title IX
work: "[Thirty] years after the Department of Education mandated that
school districts and colleges designate Title IX Coordinators, we're still
not entirely sure what the appropriate role, functions, and expectations of
Coordinators are.""8 The website continues to note the 2011 Dear Col-
league Letter "created a new profession and a new field."449 Given the
current ineffectiveness of the compliance approach, the field needs fur-
ther redefinition. Likewise, Ombuds need to determine whether the IOA
Standards are requirements or merely aspirations. Inconsistent applica-
tion of the IOA Standards of Practice creates significant questions re-
garding the value of university Ombuds. Correctly designed, both formal
and informal complaint mechanisms are necessary to bring campus sexu-
al assault out from the shadows.
447. Donna Shestowsky, Disputants' Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution
Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 549,
551 (2008).
448. About ATIXA and.Title IX, supra note 9.
449. Id.
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